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Against the backdrop of China’s expanding surveillance infrastructure, this study focuses 
on the young generation internet users in China and examines their experience with government 
and commercial surveillance as they engage on Chinese social media and online service 
platforms. A nation-wide mixed-mode survey was distributed to university students in five 
Chinese cities. Research findings suggest that the young generation internet users in China live 
in a fundamental paradox where their desire to fully engage in the digital world confronts the 
growing concerns about mass surveillance from the increasingly powerful platforms and the 
traditional state power. As a result, they would make situationally contextualized privacy 
decisions based on the type of personal information and the platform on which the information is 
disclosed. They would also practice self-censorship responding to questions about privacy and 
surveillance in online environments. These findings have important implications for research on 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The rise of the surveillance society in the past two decades has called for renewed 
attention to theory and policy on emerging surveillance practices that have penetrated every 
corner of contemporary social life (Lyon, 2002, 2015; Cohen, 2008, 2003, 2015; Richards, 
2013). In this surveillance society, precise details of individuals’ personal lives are “collected, 
stored, retrieved, and processed within huge computer databases” by corporations and 
governments to influence and manage people and populations (Lyon, 1994, 2002). In recent 
years, cutting-edge artificial intelligence based on networked machine-learning systems and new 
wave sensor-enabled devices has magnified the capacity of governments and internet platforms 
around the world to collect and process massive information about individuals and groups. This 
development of contemporary life is creating growing challenges to dominant approaches to 
privacy, which were inadequate in pinpointing sources of disruption and addressing the harms 
caused by a burgeoning array of contemporary surveillance practices.  
As traditionally understood, privacy is the right to be left alone and the right to maintain 
control over personal information flow (Warren & Brandeis, 1890; Westin, 2003). In a time of 
significant transformation in data practices enabled by information and computational 
technologies, these rights are frequently sacrificed when balanced against other pressing 
interests, such as security, efficiency, and innovation. This is so prevalent that privacy has been 
said to be on its way to become an anachronistic value (Rule, 2016, p.8). As the efficiency-
minded governments and profit-seeking businesses of our time continue to identify connections 
between personal data and new ways of control and persuasion, and successfully evade 
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entrenched regulatory approaches while doing so, it is necessary that concepts and policies 
around privacy be revisited in the context of an emerging surveillance society on a global scale.  
When considering the major changes initiated by new communication technologies, to 
borrow the words from Balkin (2014), asking what is genuinely new is to ask the wrong 
question; the focus ought to be on what features of the human condition a technology has made 
particularly salient that went relatively unnoticed before, and what consequences it will have for 
human freedom. Facing the new wave of privacy threats as identified above, it is simply not 
enough to note the ever-expanding capability of governments and private internet platforms to 
collect and monitor new personal data, such as location history, biological indicators, and 
intellectual preference. New perspectives need to be brought forward about the nature of 
contemporary surveillance practices and the purpose of privacy in the networked society; 
questions need to be asked about conventional wisdom on the binary oppositions between public 
and private and between authoritarianism and democracy that contemporary surveillance systems 
have made problematic. Only by highlighting these issues can new understandings about privacy 
be formed and new approaches to information policies around privacy and surveillance be 
properly addressed.  
China, as the world’s largest internet population and a long-time one-party post-
authoritarian state, has been placed under the spotlight in prevailing discussions about the harm 
of surveillance in the digital age. Western media have reported on China’s national surveillance 
system based on novel facial recognition technologies and a social credit system, both of which 
are under rapid development in recent years. This raises concerns about the possible abuse of 
such technologies in a non-democratic society where political dissidents have been prosecuted 
without due process and transparency (Mitchell & Diamond, 2018, Feb 2; Millward, 2018, Feb 
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3; Carney, 2018, Sept 17). One of the new developments captured in the media is that China’s 
facial recognition technologies are now capable of detecting and labeling people’s ethnicities and 
that such technologies are used to monitor the activities of Uyghur Muslims, a population that 
has been under severe state surveillance in recent years (Mozur, 2019, April 14; Doffman, 2019, 
May 3).  
However, as Richards (2013) points out, while authoritarian regimes have long been the 
primary villains in stories the West tells about surveillance, such one-dimensional Orwellian 
portraits of surveillance fail to grasp the essence of the harm of surveillance in contemporary 
societies. For instance, democratically elected governments in the West have also stepped up 
their surveillance of the public in the name of counter-terrorism, protecting cybersecurity, and a 
growing list of other concerns. Government surveillance, such as the NSA wiretapping of 
citizen’s communications and the British data-retention regulation, are some evident examples. 
Recent investigative pieces also found that U.S. universities, private foundations, and retirement 
funds have invested hundreds of millions of dollars into the facial recognition technologies 
behind state surveillance in China (Mac, Adams, & Rajagopalan, 2019, June 5). More 
importantly, the Orwellian digital dystopia account of surveillance risks losing sight of a vital 
component of contemporary surveillance systems—commercial surveillance for the purposes of 
marketing and profit making that is led by the business sector and has largely infiltrated many 
aspects of modern people’s lives.  
Currently, on the Chinese internet, more than 800 million users feed a substantial amount 
of personal data to powerful private platforms including but not limited to Alibaba, Tencent, and 
Baidu, who control the most popular online shopping, banking, mapping, and social media 
applications. This provides fertile soil for the expansion of commercial surveillance. In fact, with 
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the development of Smart City and industry transformation, China has seen accelerated growth 
in the use of big-data technology in different industries, including manufacturing, transportation, 
healthcare, retail, and e-commerce, which fuels the growth of business analytics services in 
recent years (The Financial, 2015). Moreover, business analytic services are increasingly 
cooperating with public institutions in government-related fields, thus nurturing a neoliberal 
form of governance and data politics in China (Hou, 2017).  
Against that backdrop, the Chinese surveillance society as well as the surveillance 
experience of young generation internet users in China are fundamentally multi-dimensional, 
shaped by the combined force of a traditionally strong state surveillance system and a dynamic 
commercial surveillance network. Such a surveillance system transcends what, by far, has only 
been characterized as an Orwellian digital dystopia and calls for more nuanced treatment of 
surveillance power in a non-Western context. This dissertation explores this subject by 
investigating how both state and commercial surveillance are experienced among the young 
generation internet users in China and how such experience has shaped the privacy beliefs and 
information-sharing behaviors among this unique population. This investigation seeks to shed 
light on how new generation Chinese internet users perceive surveillance practices from the 
government and internet platforms, their concerns about state and commercial surveillance 
power, and how they make contextualized privacy decisions in the emerging surveillance society 
in China.  
The population under investigation in this dissertation is university students currently 
enrolled in higher education institutions in China. This population is chosen because it is the 
most actively engaged group in contemporary Chinese information society. According to 
statistics from China Internet Network Information Center (CINIC, 2018), university students are 
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among the most active users of social media platforms, such as WeChat, QQ, and Weibo, and 
service platforms such as AliPay (online payment), Taobao (online shopping), and Meituan 
(online food-ordering). Unlike university students in the late 1980s, who played an important 
part in galvanizing social change during the democratic movements, the currently enrolled 
university students, mostly born after 2000, grew up in a time of rapid economic transformation 
and technological advancement in China. They are the generation shaped by the Chinese 
information society, which is characterized as a form of “authoritarian informationalism” that 
combines elements of capitalism, authoritarianism, and Confucianism (Jiang, 2010). As active 
users of social media and online services, these university students are also the subjects of mass 
surveillance from the state and private actors on the Chinese Internet. Their perceptions and 
behaviors regarding government and commercial surveillance practices are particularly relevant 
to an updated understanding of the Chinese surveillance society.  
The research method employed in this dissertation is an analytical survey. A nationwide 
survey project that involves an online mode and a paper mode was conducted among currently 
enrolled university students in China. The purpose of the survey is to illustrate the experience of 
young Chinese with online surveillance and how, as inhabitants of the Chinese information 
society, this technologically savvy population manages personal information sharing while 
participating in the digital social life. In the survey, participants were asked about their concerns 
regarding governmental and commercial surveillance practices and their willingness to share 
categorized personal information with different platforms, as well as various factors that affect 
the relationship between surveillance concern and information-sharing behaviors. In addition, the 
two-mode design examines the possible existence of a mode effect in which online participants 
significantly differ from paper-survey participants in key factors associated with this 
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relationship. In this manner, the survey project helps to identify the contextualized information 
privacy management strategies that Chinese university students practice as they engage with 
social media and online service platforms, and how much of a mode effect is present in 
surveillance attitude survey research in the China context.  
The theoretical perspectives and analytical tools of this dissertation are largely informed 
by the emerging field of surveillance studies, as well as recent legal and social science 
scholarship on theories and policies around privacy and surveillance. Believing that revisiting the 
concept of privacy and its purposes in the context of the surveillance society is the key to 
reiterating the value of privacy and formulating new regulatory approaches, this study builds its 
theoretical framework on research that has examined the characteristics of the modern 
surveillance system, the subject of privacy, and the contextual nature of privacy in the past two 
decades. It also seeks to interpret the Chinese surveillance society from these theoretical 
perspectives in the search for a more nuanced treatment of the surveillance experience in 
contemporary Chinese society. This chapter reviews the theoretical framework and then presents 
the chapter outline of this dissertation.  
Understanding the Surveillance Society 
The notion of the surveillance society, as argued by Lyon (2001), indicates that 
“surveillance activities have long since spilled over the edges of government bureaucracies to 
flood every conceivable social conduit” (p. 33). The surveillance society at its core is technology 
dependent; it is the result of communication and information technologies binding time and 
space in novel configurations (Lyon, 2001, p.23). Today, while government entities are still 
involved in many of the monitoring activities, the vast majority of data mining and processing 
and information trading originate in the private sector (Cohen, 2012, p.107). Moreover, there 
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exists a “public/private cooperation and co-optation” where the government is increasingly 
willing to target the owners of private infrastructure for cooperation to engage in surveillance 
(Balkin, 2014). It is, therefore, too restrictive to assume that the state is the predominant agent of 
surveillance in the digital era. Rather, the surveillance society has superseded the Orwellian 
totalitarian state-centered control, and is comprised of both state and non-state efforts to monitor 
different populations through mass surveillance (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000).  
The surveillance system is fundamentally networked. It exploits correlations between 
behaviors and predictive cues from different corners of modern life to make connections between 
systems of data and integrate them into a larger system. In this sense, the surveillance system is 
also radically decentralized. Haggerty and Ericson (2000) refer to it as the “surveillant 
assemblage,” in which surveillance grows “across a series of interconnected roots which throw 
up shoots in different locations.” Such features of the surveillance system enable deductive, 
inductive, and sematic reasoning based on voluminous assemblages of data and generate new 
knowledge about individuals that extends beyond recorded data and the context in which such 
data is collected (Nissenbaum, 2019). This remarkable potential of the surveillance system is at 
the core of the new challenge to privacy from information and computational technologies— the 
system’s ability to draw new knowledge from observed phenomena using sophisticated statistical 
analyses.  
The public’s reactions to the growing systems of surveillance, however, have not been 
consistent. As highlighted by Nissenbaum (2010), while some modern surveillance practices 
such as cameras in public places and government wiretapping are condemned and resisted by the 
public, other surveillance technologies that provide convenience, such as monitoring devices 
based on biometric data or geolocation, are celebrated. This inconsistency attests to the public’s 
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role in the extension of mass surveillance in modern society. A better understanding about the 
surveillance society requires recognition that popular support for efficient information processing 
has played an important role in accelerating the growth of modern surveillance. As noted by Rule 
(2007), the public’s expectations of “justice in treatment of individuals on the bases of their full 
record” have greatly fueled the surveillance society (p.21). It, therefore, can be argued that the 
extension of mass surveillance is not simply an institutional imposition on passive publics; it is 
rather the result of trained public expectations for efficient interactions and transactions plus the 
advancement of analytical power. 
The Subject of Privacy in the Surveillance Society 
The initial theoretical question this dissertation seeks to address is what kind of selfhood 
should information policies concerning privacy and surveillance seek to promote. The dominant 
approaches to privacy theory traditionally consider the subject of privacy to be the autonomous 
individual who possesses the capacity for rational choices and self-determination. As will be 
explained extensively in the chapters to follow, this traditional conception of the subject of 
privacy is presented with fundamental challenges on both theoretical and practical levels. In this 
dissertation, the subject of privacy is regarded as the “networked self,” which Cohen (2013) has 
conceptualized as the “dynamic, emergent subjectivity” that practices “socially situated 
boundary management.” This subject is constituted by its social and political culture, which in 
turn shapes the form of self-determination and participation. However, the liberal self that is 
autonomous and the social constructed subject are not irreconcilable opposites. They are 
“equally implausible endpoints on a continuum along which social shaping and individual liberty 
combine in varying proportions” (Cohen, 2012, p. 115).  
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This networked self also lives in a fundamental paradox. Quantitative social science 
research on privacy attitudes and behaviors has identified a “privacy paradox,” referring to the 
phenomenon that people’s concerns about privacy are unrelated to their privacy behavior. Those 
who have substantial concerns with regard to their online privacy engage in self-disclosing 
behaviors that do not reflect their concerns (Norberg, Horn, & Horne, 2007; Dienlin & Trepte, 
2015; Young & Quan-Haase, 2013). Although some studies did not, or only partially, support the 
privacy paradox due to measure construct adjustment (Baruh, Secinti, & Cemalcilar, 2017; 
Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Wu, Huang, Yen, & Popova, 2012), the privacy paradox phenomenon is 
a perfect reflection of the conflicting situation in which the subject of privacy has to constantly 
balance the desire for privacy and the desire for disclosure and communication in the 
surveillance society. It is through this process that the subject of privacy practices socially 
situated boundary management.  
To connect the research method with this theoretical perspective, participants’ privacy 
concerns as users of social networking sites and online service, their information-sharing 
behaviors, and privacy protective behaviors are examined using established measures to test 
whether a privacy paradox exists. Participants’ knowledge of existing norms of privacy policies 
are also measured and tested for a mediation effect between privacy concerns and behaviors. In 
addition, concerns about and acceptance of government surveillance is measured to explore 
whether there is a similar mechanism in the context of government surveillance. Such a study 
design helps to illustrate the conflicting conditions that the “networked self” experiences as it 





Nissenbaum (2012)’s theory on contextual integrity has significantly informed the way 
privacy is conceptualized in this study. The contextual integrity framework proposes that 
protecting privacy means not “strictly limiting access to personal information, or assuring 
people’s right to control information about themselves,” but ensuring that personal information 
“flows appropriately” (Nissenbaum, 2012, p. 2). Stated simply, the context in which personal 
information is collected and shared matters to whether privacy is invaded or not. This is because 
our social life is constituted by distinct social contexts, and privacy norms, or what is considered 
an appropriate information sharing principle, ought to be determined by information’s social 
contexts. The theory of contextual integrity posits that parameters such as “who sent the 
information, who received it, about whom it is, what types of information are involved, and the 
constrains imposed on them” should define contextual information norms; and it is regarded as 
infringing on privacy only if the contextual norms, or expectations of appropriate behaviors and 
practices, are violated (Nissenbaum, 2019).  
An important advantage of the theory of contextual integrity is that it negates the 
definition of privacy as secrecy or stoppage of flow as in traditional privacy theories. Contextual 
integrity acknowledges at the outset the critical importance of personal information sharing in 
contemporary social life. It does not necessarily consider collecting and sharing, even leakage of 
information about persons, as privacy harm. As Nissenbaum (2019) argues, when seen as 
stoppage or control of flow, privacy could be so easily “traded off” against security, efficiency, 
public health, convenience, and so on, assuming that the advancement of those cutting-edge 
imperatives requires information to flow freely. However, as contextual integrity, privacy is not 
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in contradiction to information flows needed to promote those imperatives because it allows for 
flows that are appropriate in the information context in which the exchange happens.  
Building on this theory, this study measures information sharing behaviors in a 
contextualized manner based on types of personal information and online service platforms. 
“Personal information” in this case is information about an identified person. The usage practice 
of the community defines personal information as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more 
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity” 
(European Parliament and Council, 1995, Oct 24).  
In the survey, personal information is grouped into seven categories: basic demographics 
(age, gender, education), contact (email, phone, address, social media accounts), personal 
identifiers (government ID, name), personal preference (browsing/keyword search/shopping 
history), location (real-time location, location history), financial (bank account, debit/credit 
card), and health (medical history, health condition). Moreover, based on knowledge of the 
popular online service applications among young people in China, online service is sorted into 
six types: banking, shopping, ridesharing, mapping, travel ticket booking, and health 
management. When asking about participants’ information sharing behaviors, both the 
information type and service type will be specified so that privacy attitudes and behaviors are 
captured in contextualized settings.  
The Chinese Surveillance Society 
The Chinese surveillance society under examination in this study does not conform to the 
“perniciously appealing ways of sensationalizing the Chinese Internet” (Yang, 2014). The 
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Orwellian rhetoric is neither an accurate description nor an informed and thoughtful way of 
examining the Chinese surveillance society. Neither will simplistic dichotomies of state versus 
society, authoritarian versus democracy, control versus freedom help to nurture insightful 
observations about the issues of surveillance in contemporary societies. As surveillance studies 
scholars have noted, the modern surveillance society, as the everyday routine surveillance that 
we know and experience today, is a product of modernity and the prominent features that define 
and constitute modernity (Giddens, 1985; Lyon, 2002). Therefore, surveillance has two faces: the 
fearful system that keeps track of personal lives also serves to enhance life quality and promote 
justice. Therefore, the “merely paranoid” and all negative perspectives on surveillance can 
always be challenged, and thus are “almost always inappropriate” (Lyon, 2002). Furthermore, 
post-structural analytical tools, such as Foucault’s theory of power, have prompted theorists to 
ponder surveillance’s role in modern society beyond mere repression and to ask whether 
surveillance has a productive dimension, as in whether it contributes to the shaping of modern 
subjects.  
There is little reason why such theoretical insights cannot be applied to the post-1978 
China. Contemporary Chinese society is a place where a neoliberal form of governance that aims 
to monitor and guide public sentiment is taking shape, and where a robust Internet industry is led 
by private actors, such as Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu, who actively collect, store, analyze, and 
profit from the enormous amount of behavior data produced by more than 800 million Internet 
users. It has been noted that scholarly discussions around surveillance in China have been almost 
solely focused on political control by the state, while scholarship on surveillance in the Western 
context addresses not only the impact of surveillance on democratic development but also on 
issues such as neoliberalism governance, marketing, discrimination, and equality (Hou, 2017). 
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As a result, predominant theses on surveillance in China and the complications surrounding it 
remain limited, even though research on Chinese Internet has been abundant (Yang, 2014). Many 
examples of creeping surveillance have been given, but little theoretical novelty and imagination 
is provided about the lives that are under heavy surveillance from both the state and private 
actors.  
Nevertheless, state surveillance remains an important focus of this study. China’s unique 
political system and the lack of procedural transparency in a one-party non-democratic state, 
coupled with its bad record on human rights issues, invite questions about possible abuse of 
surveillance power and its effects on the lives of average Chinese people. To illustrate this point, 
the survey method employed in this study uses a special design: both a web-based and paper-
based survey, identical in content, will be administered to sampled university students. This will 
address whether participants answer differently to the questions about surveillance and privacy in 
the online environment because of fear of government oversight. Moreover, questions about 
government surveillance concern and the perceived need for government surveillance are asked 
in the survey in order to determine the young generation’s perception of government surveillance 
in relation to commercial surveillance on the Chinese Internet.  
Significance of Study 
The significance of this dissertation is threefold. First, theoretically, it seeks to bridge the 
dialogue between legal scholarship on surveillance, specifically the U.S. legal theories on 
freedom of speech and its relationship to privacy and surveillance, with the surveillance studies 
scholarship, which is largely influenced by contemporary social theories. The goal here is to 
establish a rich and concrete understanding of the landscape of modern surveillance and the 
value of privacy in such contexts. This is important because, in order to formulate meaningful 
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reform in information policy, theory must open itself to and address the postmodernist critique of 
the fundamental assumptions regarding the liberal selfhood and reconsider the relationship 
between selfhood and surveillance. As our understanding of surveillance and the information 
society in general deepen, it is critical that the value of privacy be reconceptualized beyond “the 
right to be left alone” as stated in Warren and Brandeis (1890) and “the right to control the flow 
of personal information” as advanced by Westin (2003; 2015), to address the emerging problems 
facing information policy on privacy and surveillance. Despite the focus on the Chinese 
surveillance society, much of the theoretical insights in the English-speaking scholarship are of 
significant reference value to this study. These theoretical considerations address problems 
regarding global information societies of which China is an increasingly important participant.   
This dissertation seeks to turn from the one-dimensional focus on authoritarian state 
control to a perspective informed by surveillance studies scholarship, which views surveillance 
as a dynamic, decentralized system that encompasses everyday encounters in modern life across 
democratic and authoritarian states. State-centered censorship and control has been dominating 
discussions about the Chinese Internet. However, as new information and communication 
technologies evolve, surveillance as an expanding social control tool that has been widely 
employed in China is worth more attention. By examining the surveillance experience of 
university students, this study will demonstrate how young, educated, technologically savvy 
populations in China understand and react to surveillance encounters in which the state and the 
private industry are cooperative in enforcing mass surveillance.  
Second, as an empirical investigation into the surveillance experience of modern 
individuals, this dissertation employs established survey instruments on concepts, such as 
information privacy concern, government surveillance concern, willingness to disclose personal 
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information, and privacy literacy, and connects the quantitative methods with legal and social 
theories on privacy and surveillance. Research on consumer privacy concerns and behaviors, 
which will be addressed in the method chapter, contributes to the manner in which concepts 
around privacy are measured quantitatively with good validity and reliability scores. However, 
they often speak more to consumer behavior models than to information policies on privacy. 
This study works to bridge the quantitative measures with theories on privacy’s subject and 
context and explores the connections among concepts.  
A number of published English works have addressed issues of privacy in China in 
various ways (Zhu, 1997; McDougall & Hansson, 2002; Yao-Huai, 2005; Cheung, 2009; Wang, 
2009; Xue, 2010; Wu et al. 2011), but few have taken an empirical approach to examine the 
attitude and behaviors of Chinese Internet users using quantitative survey methods. The limited 
number of Chinese scholars who used surveys to investigate privacy behaviors (Shen 2015, 
2017) focused solely on consumer behaviors. This study aims to fill this empirical gap in English 
literature on privacy and surveillance in China.  
Lastly, with regard to policy and regulation, by examining the subject of information 
policy and the value of privacy in the surveillance society theoretically and empirically, this 
dissertation addresses the inadequacies of the current privacy policy framework and its 
underlying assumptions about the human self. Furthermore, it explores new ways of 
conceptualizing information policy that takes into consideration the socially constructed self and 
the highly contextualized privacy attitude and behaviors showed in contemporary inhabitants of 
the surveillance society. Such an endeavor entails a theoretical conversation between traditional 
legal theory and contemporary social theory’s thinking on the social and cultural aspects of the 
human condition. This dissertation seeks to engage in such conversations and contribute to 
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discussions about the framework of information policy on privacy and surveillance in the global 
information society. Furthermore, because this dissertation is situated in China and among the 
young, educated, technologically savvy users, it will address specifically the unique 
characteristics of the Chinese surveillance society and the contemporary Chinese concept of 
privacy, which should inform law and regulations regarding surveillance and privacy in China.  
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation comprises five chapters. The present Chapter I is an introduction, 
providing the background, general framework, and aims and objectives of the study. The 
theoretical framework of this study is laid out in this chapter. The significance and organization 
of this dissertation are introduced.  
Chapter 2 is devoted to a review of literature in law, social science, and surveillance 
studies that have informed the theories and methods used in this dissertation. Existing 
scholarship is synthetized into four distinctive themes: classical free speech theories and its 
limitation, theories and concepts of privacy, surveillance studies and the Chinese internet, and 
the Chinese concept of privacy. Research questions are proposed at the end of this chapter.  
Chapter 3 introduces the research methods employed in this dissertation. Details of 
survey methods, including sampling, implementation, measures and measurement, data 
collection and analysis, as well as justifications for using a mix-mode survey design are 
explained.  
Chapter 4 presents the main findings of the survey and the results of the research 
questions on Chinese university students’ awareness and attitudes toward government and 
commercial surveillance, knowledge of platform privacy policies, social media and online 
service usage, and personal information sharing behaviors based on information categories and 
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platform types. This chapter also presents the differences between online and paper survey 
responses in key variables.  
Chapter 5 reviews the findings of this study concluded from the survey project. 
Theoretical and methodological implications of the study results are discussed. Reflections on 
methods and the Institutional Review Board’s review of this dissertation are also presented. 








CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews existing literature that has informed the theories and methods 
employed in this dissertation. This literature review covers scholarship under four distinct 
themes. First, a review of classical free speech theories and their relationship to surveillance lays 
out the traditional legal framework under which the right of privacy emerged and the harm of 
surveillance is identified. The limitations of this traditional approach when applied to the issues 
around surveillance will be addressed. The second part on conceptualizing privacy in the 
surveillance society reviews the primary ways in which privacy has been theorized in existing 
scholarship and identifies two theoretical perspectives that are particularly helpful in 
understanding the value of privacy in surveillance contexts: the theory of contextual integrity and 
the conceptualization of the subject of privacy in the surveillance society.  
The third part on surveillance studies and the Chinese Internet introduces the field of 
surveillance studies and applies its theoretical perspectives to the study of online surveillance in 
China. Making such a connection is important for this dissertation because it introduces new 
analytical tools to the study of the Chinese internet and brings the study of internet control in 
China to a more sophisticated level of analysis by connecting it to the discussion of techniques of 
government. The last part on the Chinese concept of privacy reviews scholarship that took a 
cultural perspective in understanding privacy in the Chinese context. It addresses the questions 
that discussions on the Chinese concept of privacy have yet to answer and identifies the gap in 
the literature on the issue of privacy in China. Research questions are proposed at the end of 
chapter two.   
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Classical Free Speech Theories and Surveillance 
The commitment to freedoms of thought, belief, and intellectual privacy lie at the 
foundation of classical theories on freedom of speech within the Anglo-American civil liberties 
tradition (Richard, 2013). The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in the past hundred years strives for broader protection of free and 
unfettered thought and belief, prioritizing free speech over other social values with which it 
comes into conflict (Shiffrin, 2016, p.7). Under this tradition, the expansion of surveillance in 
modern societies is harmful to this tradition in two ways. First, surveillance by government and 
private actors threatens freedom of thought by creating a “chilling effect” that stifles the 
“breathing space” that free speech needs in order to survive. Second, surveillance creates a 
power imbalance between the watched, often understood in individual terms, and those who are 
watching, and increases the risk of an Orwellian tyranny (Richard, 2013). This understanding of 
surveillance heavily influenced the prevailing form of analysis about the emerging surveillance 
practices and its relationship to privacy. It is therefore necessary to revisit this literature and 
examine its place in contemporary understanding of surveillance in the information society.  
Freedom of speech has been interpreted to promote many values including truth-seeking 
self-governance, autonomy, tolerance, and associated cultural values. The three prominent 
theories of free speech include the marketplace of ideas theory derived from the work of John 
Milton (1644) and John Stuart Mill (1966), self-governance theory developed by American 
philosopher Alexander Meiklejohn (1961), and a general theory of individual autonomy 
addressed by many scholars including Ronald Dworkin (1988) and Edwin Baker (2010). Under 
each theory, scholars have developed extensive arguments as to why society should grant 
individuals the greatest possible rights to freedom of thought and belief in the form of free 
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speech. Nevertheless, these mainstream free speech theories have been challenged by theoretical 
development in fields like feminist theory, critical race theory and literary theory, as well as by 
social science studies on human behaviors, leaving the traditional liberal political theory’s 
picture of the “atomistic individual” in doubt (Bunker, 2001, p.100). 
Marketplace of ideas 
Marketplace theory is by far the most widely acknowledged and the most questioned 
theory on free speech. It posits that there exists a free market for ideas where different views and 
opinions can battle with each other and, given enough time, truth will eventually win out as a 
result of free competition. As stated in Justice Holmes’ famous dissenting opinion in Abram v. 
United States (1919), “The ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas,” and 
“the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”  
Marketplace theory finds its root in the enlightenment philosophy. In an article titled 
What is Enlightenment?, Immanuel Kant (1784) called for the public use of reason in bringing 
about enlightenment and argued that enlightenment is almost inevitable if freedom is allowed. 
The enlightenment philosophers believed that reason is a distinct capacity and property of the 
human mind and called upon humanity to use reason to think for itself and to discover the truth 
for itself instead of following what the authorities had to announce. Likewise, marketplace 
theory invests heavily on human rationality in telling truth from falsity in the battle between 
received views and new ideas in the marketplace, an idea that has been described as “wildly 
optimistic” (Bunker, 2001, p.6).  
Marketplace theory is also under siege because it presupposes a transcendent, nonrelative 
“Truth” and fails to address power relations in the marketplace. This is especially relevant under 
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the topic of surveillance because, looking from a postmodernist perspective, it is primarily power 
that determines the production of discourses of truth. As stated by philosopher Michel Foucault 
(1980),  “We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise 
power except through the production of truth” (p. 93). In other words, truth is what is allowed to 
have truth effects by the powerful in a society. The marketplace is never actually free and equal 
in terms of access and power. Certain dominant groups could have enormous control over the 
mass media and exclude viewpoints that challenge the status quo (Bunker, 2001, p.8). Most 
importantly, under the marketplace logic, privacy restrictions would be deemed as barriers to 
truth-discovery and efficiency, hampering markets from responding to consumer preferences 
(Cohen, 2012, p.11). Thus, the marketplace justification for free speech encourages personal-
information processing, and is therefore often antithetical to privacy protection.  
Self-governance 
Self-governance theory regards freedom of speech as the means by which democracy 
functions. It premises that citizens in a democratic society should have access to information and 
knowledge relevant to issues of public concern in order to make informed decisions about their 
lives. Under self-governance theory, the protection offered by the First Amendment to speech is 
to encourage the “fullest participation in understanding of those problems with which the citizens 
of a self-governing society must deal” (Meiklejohn, 2000, p.88). As such, self-governance theory 
favors protection of speech for public purpose over private speech. Meiklejohn later responded to 
this critique by including artistic, scientific, and cultural expressions into the realm of public 
speech (Meiklejohn, 1961). A larger criticism against self-governance theory centers around its 
casting free speech into an instrumental role on its usefulness to voters (Bunker, 2002, p. 10). 
Moreover, as a democracy-based theory, self-governance theory contextualizes freedom of 
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speech in a democratic society, specifically in the American model, which renders it a 
justification that can hardly transcend the world of Western democracies.  
Self-governance theory is not well-equipped to respond to the issues around surveillance 
for several reasons. First, political power infiltrates every aspect of modern life including not 
only state institutions, such as governments, police, and courts, but also schools, hospitals, 
prisons, and in the streets under surveillance cameras. Postmodernist analysis of power calls into 
question the traditional identification of power with political power and the concentration of 
power analysis on state institutions (Lemke, 2011, p.10). Second, like in marketplace theory, 
self-governance theory commits to “an abstract and disembodied vison of the self,” one that 
possesses the possibility of “rational value-neutrality” (Cohen, 2012, p.4). Such an atomistic 
individual with certain claims of autonomy from power relations has been posited as the basis for 
extensive individual rights by liberal theorists from John Locke to John Rawls (Bunker, 1996). 
This “liberal self” is challenged by the structuralism notion of the human self that is constructed 
by culture or language, and by communitarian views of the human self that is created and 
realized through community and society in which individuals are raised. This tension between 
the autonomous self and the socially constructed self is at the core of the debate on information 
policy between legal theory and contemporary social theory. Nevertheless, the autonomous 
human self underlines much of the classical free speech theories, including individual autonomy 
theory.  
Individual-autonomy 
Individual autonomy, especially the non-consequentialist approach, may be the most 
relatable among the classical free speech theories to issues of surveillance, large because of its 
underlying Kantian moral imperative approach to individual freedom and dignity. Under the 
 23 
nonconsequentialist approach, freedom of speech is an end in itself rather than a means to 
achieve a collective good (Baker, 1989, p.5). It recognizes freedom of speech as a moral 
imperative to regard individuals as rational and autonomous beings. In other words, freedom of 
speech underlines what it means to be human; it is valuable even if it does not in fact further 
human development. Individual autonomy theory therefore argues for freedom of thoughts as a 
moral imperative primarily centered with the individual, which makes it less susceptible to 
critiques that the liberal self is an inaccurate representation of individual compared to the other 
two theories (Bunker, 1996). Thus, individual autonomy theory could be a strong analytical tool 
to deploy when it comes to excessive mass surveillance of personal information and activities.  
These three classical free speech theories, which generally reside in the tradition of 
liberal political theory, display some common weaknesses such as the assumption of an abstract, 
atomistic, disembodied human self and a one-dimensional static power relation. However, 
because classical free speech theories have been very wary of the expansion of government 
power over individual rights and freedoms, they are relevant where governments operate 
surveillance programs on individuals’ personal information and communication (e.g. NSA mass 
surveillance programs targeting citizens of the U.S. and other countries) and arguably very 
helpful in pushing back at state surveillance. In such scenarios, classical free speech theories 
provide sufficient theoretical justifications for containing government surveillance power and 
protecting individual rights to freedom of thought and intellectual privacy.  
However, in addressing the harms of modern surveillance technologies and practices, 
classical free speech theory is lacking in many ways. First, surveillance practices in our time 
have spread beyond nonconsensual state monitoring and become what Bauman and Lyon (2013) 
calls “liquid surveillance,” in which individuals sometimes willingly allow and participate in 
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automated data collection and monitoring, and government and nongovernment surveillance 
deeply intertwined. Therefore, the solution to the problems of surveillance can no longer be 
confined to regulation of government actors, as classical free speech theories have focused on. 
Under the new-school speech regulation (Balkin, 2014), state and private surveillance are related 
parts of the same problem. Thus, classical free speech theories and First Amendment law, which 
requires state action to be invoked, is not sufficient in addressing the complex and dynamic 
power relations involved in modern surveillance practices.  
Second, as mentioned above, classical free speech theories’ heavy investment in the 
rational autonomous individual is inadequate in understanding the surveillance subject that is the 
modern individual. Philosophies after structuralism have generally understood the human self as 
socially constituted, an extension of the structure and community in to which one is born and 
raised. From the Foucauldian notion of panopticon, referring to the modern society since the late 
nineteenth century, individuals have been placed in a state of constant visibility and become the 
“object of information, never a subject of communication” (Foucault, 2012, p. 200). The 
autonomy of the modern individual is highly limited under this poststructuralist view of power 
and control in modern society. Therefore, to properly examine the individuals under surveillance, 
the traditional conception of the liberal self needs to be accommodated to address the challenges 
brought by postmodern notions of the surveillance subject.   
Finally, there exists a strong cultural tendency in classical free speech theories to 
associate freedom of speech solely with liberal democracy, featuring the right to free speech and 
privacy as honorable characteristics that distinguish Western democracies from authoritarian 
regimes in the world. As Fish (1994) argued, in the rhetoric of American life, free speech is filled 
with political agendas that people with certain political ideology wish to advance; it is a “label” 
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that people only wish their favorite to wear (p.102). As such, discussions about the value of free 
speech seldom reach beyond the limited number of countries in North America and the Europe. 
However, as noted by Richards (2013), in today’s world, authoritarian regimes are not the only 
institutions that wish to surveil; democratic governments in the West have committed to 
monitoring the public in the name of counter-terrorism and protecting cybersecurity. The 
Orwellian Big Brother shows itself in both forms of governance in the surveillance age. This is 
crucial to acknowledge if any substantial understanding is to be obtained about what modern 
surveillance is and what its purposes are.  
Conceptualizing Privacy in the Surveillance Society 
Surveillance, as “the rapidly increasing ways in which personal details are collected, 
stored, transmitted, checked, and used as means of influencing and managing people and 
population,” makes visibility a social and a political issue in a new way (Lyon, 2002). 
Surveillance invites the question of privacy. Yet privacy, as a concept and a way to frame the 
various challenges brought by a growing surveillance society globally, has been widely criticized 
for being profoundly inadequate in the face of the challenges brought by surveillance. Like the 
classical free speech scholarship, privacy scholarship tends to be dominated by legal approaches 
and methods, and is therefore faced with serious critique from the surveillance scholarship. 
Much of the critique of privacy, interestingly, resembles those received by free speech theories: 
reliance on the liberal assumption about the human self or subjectivity, too implicated in right-
based discourse, culturally relative, and ultimately practically ineffective (Bennett, 2011).  
Addressing the critique of privacy scholarship, including individualism, spatial 
metaphors, and human right rhetoric, Bennett (2011) pointed out that the privacy value in fact 
has been “reframed at a governance level to meet the collective challenges posed by the 
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broadening and deepening of surveillance.” Although some surveillance studies scholarship has 
been resistant to the concept of privacy to the extent of intentionally avoiding using the term 
(Aas, Gundhus, & Lomel, 2008), discussion around the regime of privacy is unlikely to go away 
because, for all the critique, it can still “displays a remarkable resilience as a way to regulate the 
processing of personal information by public and private organization” (Bennett, 2011).  
The concept of privacy and its value in the surveillance context is a crucial component of 
this study because of its focus on the individual experience with personal information gathering 
and surveillance by state and private actors. The following sections will discuss how privacy has 
been theorized in recent scholarship and the conceptual adjustments that have been made to 
address the challenges brought by the emerging surveillance society. Three important theoretical 
perspectives will be addressed in this section: Alan Westin’s privacy constructs, Helen 
Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity, and Julie Cohen’s conceptualization of the subject 
of privacy in the surveillance society.  
Westin’s Privacy Constructs 
As one of the first and most comprehensive inquiries into privacy and its value, Alan 
Westin (2015) defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine 
for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others”; it is a “temporary withdraw” from society “in a state of solitude or small-group intimacy 
or reserve” (p.5). Westin’s Privacy and Freedom was first published in 1967. Writing during the 
Cold War, Westin presented a quite individualist view of privacy and consequentially created a 
binary opposition between democratic societies, where individual privacy is mostly valued, and 
authoritarian societies, where almost no privacy is granted to individuals (p. 25). On the social-
cultural level, privacy was regarded as an arena of democratic politics related to the social 
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legitimacy of government. On the individual level, privacy was connected with individual life in 
Western democracies, emphasizing that the individual’s right to choose between self-revelation 
and reservation is essential to self-development. Such theorization of privacy, one that echoes 
strongly with the classical free speech theories of democratic governance and self-realization, is 
an essential component of the framework on which current privacy policies are built.  
In addition to his theoretical contributions, Westin conducted a series of public opinion 
surveys that helped to build the basis for how privacy is measured and regulated in the U.S. In 
his series of survey research, Westin introduced three categories of individuals in relation to 
privacy—fundamentalist (high privacy concern and high distrust in privacy protections), 
pragmatists (mid-level concern and distrust), and unconcerned (low concern and distrust)—based 
on respondent answers to three questions about privacy concerns. Using this categorization, 
Westin testified to the U.S. Congress that privacy policy should focus on the “privacy 
pragmatists” who are willing to trade privacy off against other gains (Martin & Nissenbaum, 
2016). Westin’s characterization of privacy pragmatist as “Homo Economicus” who try to 
maximize the expected utility of personal information in the market through consumer choice, 
and who would favor a notice and choice approach to privacy policies (Hoofnagle & Urban, 
2014), laid the foundation for privacy policies in the U.S. This framework had since greatly 
influenced the privacy policies model of today’s Internet platforms across the world. Westin’s 
substantial contribution to the study of information privacy is highly respected today, but his 
methodologies and the underlying assumption about the privacy in his public opinion survey 
research has been criticized in recent scholarship. 
Martin & Nissenbaum (2016) pointed out that terms such as “pragmatists” or 
“unconcerned” helped to forge the incorrect understanding that individuals are willing to trade 
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privacy off against free services or other benefits, a mentality from which companies and 
regulators made individual choices the nexus of regulation. As a result, the burden on privacy 
regulators to commit to protecting privacy rights is lessened because the focus of privacy policy 
is shifted to informed choices rather than the more fundamental question of whether privacy as 
an important social value is in fact protected by such polices. Hoofnagle & Urban (2014) made a 
special note on the nature of Westin’s series of survey research, highlighting that these research 
were largely tailored to address public policy issues concerning their various sponsors and were 
rarely published in academic journals. Despite the problems, Westin’s recognition of privacy as a 
liberal value and its essential place in modern society has been described as “prescient” in its 
time (Solove, 2015). 
Privacy as Contextual Integrity 
Nissenbaum (2010) parted way from Westin’s notion of privacy protection, which entails 
“strictly limiting access to personal information or assuring people’s right to control information 
about themselves” by proposing that privacy ought to be considered in terms of contextual 
integrity (p. 2). Paying particular attention to the context in which privacy is expected, 
Nissenbaum proposed that protecting privacy means ensuring that personal information “flows 
appropriately” based on “context-relative information norms” (p. 129). From this perspective, 
privacy does not mean that no information flows or that information is only allowed to flow only 
when the information subject consents, but that information flow is allowed as long as the actor 
(sender, recipient), the attributes (information types), and transmission principles (commercial or 
noncommercial) are legitimate in the context (Nissenbaum, 2010, p.140-147; Martin & 
Nissenbaum 2016). 
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Understood as a contextual integrity, privacy is not given away or violated simply 
because control over personal information is ceded; privacy is violated only if personal 
information is disclosed inappropriately. When an individual gives up information, it doesn’t 
necessarily mean that he or she had given up privacy as well. As such, privacy as contextual 
integrity can account for the fact that people often willingly release and disclose information 
about themselves even when they show high concern for privacy, a phenomenon named the 
“privacy paradox,” which has been addressed in a line of empirical research (Barnes, 2006; 
Norberg, Horn, & Horne, 2007; Young & Quan-Haase, 2013; Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Baruh, 
Secinti, & Cemalcilar, 2017).  
The theory of contextual integrity acknowledges the critical importance of personal 
information sharing in contemporary social life. It does not necessarily regard the collecting and 
sharing of information about persons, even the leakage of such information, as privacy harm. 
This perspective makes the theory of contextual integrity stand out in the surveillance era. As 
Nissenbaum (2019) argued, privacy as contextual integrity is not in contradiction to information 
flows needed to promote security, efficiency, convenience, public health, ect, because it allows 
for flows that are appropriate in the information context where the exchange happens, thus lifting 
privacy from its long-time loser’s position when balanced against the cutting-edge imperatives in 
the information age.  
Reconceptualizing the Subject of Privacy 
In the critical legal scholarship, Cohen’s conceptualization of the subject and value of 
privacy is a significant upgrade of the theory on privacy (Cohen, 2008; 2012; 2013). Critiquing 
the “liberal self” who has been “the subject of privacy theory and privacy policymaking,” Cohen 
(2013) argued that the autonomous self that is free from its social and cultural context does not 
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exit and never has. What should be the real subject of privacy law and policy is a self that is 
socially constructed and emerged from preexisting cultural and relational basis (Cohen, 2012, p. 
19). In this sense, the self could not have an autonomous core because we are born and remain 
situated within cultural context and power relations; privacy should also not be a fixed condition 
because the self’s relationship to social and cultural context is fundamentally dynamic (Cohen, 
2013).  
What Cohen has accomplished with this theorization is to bring what she calls “a 
postliberal theory of selfhood” into the legal and theoretical discussions about privacy. More 
importantly, she pointed out that the autonomous selfhood and social shaping are not mutually 
exclusive. Cohen (2013) argued that recognizing that the self is socially constructed and remains 
situated in its cultural and social contexts does not forfeit individual autonomy; instead, it puts 
subjectivity correctly in the space between the experience of autonomous selfhood and the reality 
of social shaping. When put this way, privacy can be defined as “a function in the interplay 
between emergent selfhood and social shaping” (Cohen, 2013).  
Cohen’s critique of the liberal self does not stand alone. Bunker (1996) addressed the 
conception of the liberal self and its problems in thinking about theories of free speech. Solove 
(2013) also provided insightful critique of current privacy policies, which he argues find its root 
in liberal individualism that presuppose an autonomous self who are able to make informed, 
rational decisions about personal information sharing. This view of privacy self-management, 
according to Solove, is tasked with doing work beyond its capabilities because of the cognitive 
problems lying within the individuals and structural problems beyond individual control.  
Cohen also incorporates the surveillance studies perspective in her theory on privacy, 
unravelling the relations between U.S. privacy theories, which are deeply rooted in the tradition 
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of liberal political economy, and the emerging field of surveillance studies that rely on the 
Foucauldian poststructuralist analysis of the relationship between surveillance and the 
development of situated subjects and communities (Cohen, 2015). By recalibrating the privacy 
subject to account for a poststructuralism notion of subjectivity, Cohen reconceptualized privacy 
as a protection of the “dynamic, emergent subjectivity from the surveillance efforts of 
commercial and government to render individuals as fixed, transparent, and predictable” (Cohen, 
2013).  
Under this framework, the value of privacy no longer carries the spatial implication as 
inherent in “the right to be left alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890); nor does privacy simply mean 
individual control of personal information flow (Westin, 2013). The value of privacy becomes 
the interest in the breathing room where the autonomous self practices contextualized boundary 
management while living through the daily surveillance of the networked society. Thus, Cohen’s 
conception of privacy is connected with the surveillance studies scholarship that emphasizes 
controlling nature of contemporary surveillance while still allowing a space for autonomous self-
formation and self-determination.  
Surveillance Studies and the Chinese Internet 
Research interests in the topic of surveillance in its modern form can be traced back to 
scholarship since the 1950s, but surveillance as a field of study only became salient after 9/11 
(Lyon, Ball, & Haggerty, 2012, p.2). Surveillance studies is multi-disciplinary and includes a 
wide range of scholars across the social sciences, arts, and humanities. Building on Michel 
Foucault’s landmark study of the emergence of modern techniques of social discipline, the 
analytical tools employed in surveillance scholarship reside in the poststructuralism tradition 
where power is deemed “a complex strategic situation in a particular society” (Foucault, 1980, p. 
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93). In this line of thinking, the concentration of power analysis solely on state institutions is 
challenged; the idea that power relations are primarily repressive is also called into question 
(Lemke, 2011, p.10-11).  
Surveillance scholars have employed Foucault’s analysis of power and control to grasp 
the larger operations of power within atomized, decentralized surveillance encounters 
(Andrejevic, 2005; Marwick, 2012; Staples, 2014). Some surveillance theorists even argue that 
in networked societies surveillance operations are more decentralized than Foucault’s work 
suggests. Drawing from the work of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) on the system of social control, 
Haggerty & Ericson (2000) proposed the concept “surveillant assemblage,” referring to the 
prevailing model of surveillance “abstracting human bodies from their territorial setting and 
separating them into a series of discrete flows,” which are then reassembled into distinct “data 
doubles” for scrutiny and targeted intervention. This assemblage operates “across both state and 
extra-state institutions” instead of “exemplifying Orwell’s totalitarian state-centered Oceana” 
(Haggerty & Ericson, 2000). The assemblage perspective transforms the purpose and hierarchies 
of surveillance and have led to the field’s more nuanced treatment of surveillance in the Western 
context. However, such theoretical depth has not been observed in the narratives of surveillance 
in non-Western countries such as China.  
Surveillance and China 
Recent media coverage of surveillance in China is vivid with the image of an Orwellian 
dystopia (Mitchell & Diamond, 2018, Feb 2; Millward, 2018, Feb 3; Carney, 2018, Sept 17). 
Concerns have been raised regarding mass government surveillance in an authoritarian state, 
where due process and transparency are lacking compared to advanced democracies in the West. 
It is specially concerning when it comes to the Chinese Communist Party’s treatment of political 
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dissidents historically and now. As have been well illustrated in recent reports on the Chinese 
surveillance state, the emerging virtual social credit system in China can easily be used by the 
state powers to punish those who are deemed the enemy of the state through total disabling of 
their participation in the information society (Botsman, 2017).  
It is, however, reasonable to suspect that the Chinese surveillance society stretches more 
complicated dimensions beyond the authoritarian state and its political dissidents. As Hou (2017) 
observed, scholarship on surveillance in the Western context is often treated differently than in 
China: When academia talks about surveillance practices in the Western context their focus 
includes not only the impact of surveillance on democratic development but also on issues such 
as neoliberal governance, marketing, discrimination and equality; however, discussions of 
surveillance in the context of China focus almost solely on political control by the authoritarian 
state on its people, allowing simplistic dichotomies of state versus society and control versus 
freedom. As important as it is to highlight the overt state surveillance in China, discussions 
around mass surveillance in China requires new analytical tools and theoretical novelty in order 
to develop nuanced and insightful understandings about contemporary surveillance in China and 
the global surveillance society in general.  
As has been noted, metaphors like Big Brother are outdated for surveillance power in 
modern society; dichotomous oppositions between freedom and security are superficial and 
unhelpful in facilitating insightful arguments about issues of contemporary surveillance 
operations (Gillion & Monahan, 2012). This is true not only for surveillance in Western 
democracies, but also for the novel surveillance practices and experiences in contemporary 
China. This dissertation argues that popular narratives of a faraway Orwellian dystopia compress 
the space of dialogue through which various surveillance practices across different form of 
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governance can be investigated, and stifles theoretical imagination for studying surveillance in 
China. Moreover, it has become a reality that both authoritarian regimes and democratically-
elected governments in our time have committed to monitoring and managing the population 
through the assistance from modern surveillance technologies. In this regard, moving beyond the 
binary oppositions between authoritarianism and democracy might help reveal substantial 
insights about the nature of modern surveillance and its purpose.  
Studying Online Surveillance in China 
Questions about how the state deters and monitors the internet in China have attracted 
extensive academic attention in the English-speaking academia in the past two decades. From the 
early works that detailed the practices of Internet control deployed by the state against dissident 
activities in cyberspace (Chase & Mulvenon, 2003; Wu & Goldsmith, 2006), to empirical 
research that examined Chinese online censorship tactics, structure, and actors (MacKinnon, 
2009; Bamman, O’Connor & Smith, 2012; King, Pan & Roberts, 2013), to critical studies that 
reflected on early works that overemphasized the revolutionary potential of the Internet in China 
(Leibolo, 2011; Lee, Liu & Li, 2013; Lee & Liu 2016; Hou, 2017), scholarly interests shifted 
from the digital libertarian ideal that regards the Internet as a regime-changing force in the 
authoritarian state to broadened discussions about Internet governance. Debates have been 
brought beyond issues of dissidents-versus-the state and toward more complex issues concerning 
power and control on the Chinese Internet.   
In as early as 2003, Christopher Hughes had proposed that Chinese Internet studies apply 
the Foucauldian Panopticon concept to explain the culture of surveillance in cyberspace 
(Hughes, 2003). This call has recently been answered by surveillance studies scholars, 
specifically those that focus on the control practices of the Chinese Internet with an emphasis on 
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governance and governmentality (Vuori & Paltemaa, 2015; Hou, 2017). These new perspectives 
have brought the study of Chinese Internet control to a more sophisticated level of analysis by 
connecting it to the discussion of techniques of government for the first time. 
It is important to note that the Foucauldian and Deleuzian analysis of the system of 
control in modern society, on which much of the surveillance scholarship is built, is very much 
targeted at capitalism and neoliberalism. So how could it be applied to the Chinese context? In 
fact, contemporary China after the “Opening and Reform” program in the late 1970s has 
undergone a series of dramatic social transitions. These changes led to “the abandon of the 
effective massline politics that characterized the Maoist era in favour of a reconfigured version 
of ‘scientific social engineering and socialist planning’ combined with neo-liberal strategies of 
‘governing from a distance’ through the development of new technologies of the self” (Jeffereys 
& Sigley, 2009, p.2). In other words, China’s adoption of market-based economic reforms has 
resulted in a “hybrid socialist-neoliberal form of political rationality,” which is both authoritarian 
in a familiar political and technocratic sense and also seeks to govern through planning and 
administrative rationality (Jeffereys & Sigley, 2009, p.5). Therefore, concerns of 
governmentality can and need to be extended to the Chinese context to highlight the changes in 
the nature of the Chinese Internet governance, particularly the enactment of online security 
practices. 
In fact, there exists a body of literature on governmentalities in China that has noted the 
trend of neoliberal governance, pointing to the nuanced changes that have taken place in the 
ways Internet content is regulated (Greenhalgh & Edwin, 2005; Jefferys, 2009; Vuori & 
Paltemaa, 2015). Some pointed out that China as a regime with full powers to directly censor 
usually avoids doing so. For example, a Harvard study discovered that the regulation practices on 
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the Chinese Internet intend not so much on deleting all together forbidden content, but instead 
focused on distraction, cheerleading, and preventing meaningful collective action (King et. al, 
2013). Others have found that the post-totalitarian China protects its political core by trying to 
prevent public discourse on its leaders and key opponents from going viral (Vuori & Paltemaa, 
2015), and utilizes the market for online opinion surveillance (Hou, 2017).  
As noted by Yang (2014), our understanding of the multidimensional Chinese Internet 
and the dynamics of contestation surrounding it remains limited despite the abundant and still 
thriving research on the Chinese Internet. The reason for this limitation, Yang argues, is a bias in 
these studies toward “sweeping and dichotomous analytical categories,” including state versus 
netizens and authoritarianism versus democracy (Yang, 2014). Studying online surveillance in 
China requires a resistance to such a binary dichotomy and a more sophisticated level of analysis 
informed by the surveillance studies scholarship, which is what the this research aims to achieve.   
The Chinese Concept of Privacy 
Understanding the value of privacy in the cultural context of China is necessary to inform 
future information policy on privacy in a contextualized manner. Given its long history, 
geographical spread, large population, and ethnic diversity, it is reasonable to suspect that there 
exists a wider range of variation in China about the concept of privacy (McDougall & Hansson, 
2002). Chinese people at various times and places have demonstrated an acute awareness and 
appreciation of privacy, although the ways of thinking about privacy differ greatly in different 
times and places and among different groups of people.  
History and literature studies have demonstrated that the Chinese concept of privacy 
predates the modern era. Chinese debates on the political and ethical implications of the gong 
[public, public space, open, communal] and si [personal, self, selfish, private] spheres go back to 
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the Warring States period (475-221 BC). Confucian debates about gong and si can be found in 
writings throughout the Tang and Song period (618-1270). Based on analyses of the vocabulary 
for the debate between gong and si in the Tang texts, historians noted that, acting for private 
interests in the public domain is always considered bad, while acting for private interests in the 
private domain could be either good or bad depending on circumstances (McDougall, 2002). In 
the twelfth century philosophical texts, the term si retained positive as well as negative attributes. 
The Song intellectual Sima Guang drew a clear distinction between gong and si, and argued that 
government institutions must always function in the interests of the survival of the state’s 
political integrity, but did not propose that private interests should be challenged or suppressed 
for that purpose (Bol, 1993).  
Confucianism as the most prominent philosophical tradition in China values intimate 
relationships and self-discovery. The central role of the family in Confucianism gives family a 
far greater doctrinal importance than it has in most Western systems of thought (Whitman, 
1985). While Confucian ideology emphasizes an orderly society built on a parallel hierarchy 
system where people are guided toward correct attitudes and behaviors, Taoists place no 
comparable emphasis on family and social bounds. Instead, Taoism stresses the virtues of 
inwardness and of things concealed. This withdrawal is regarded as a means of survival and a 
necessity in troubled times (Whitman, 1985). Both Confucianism and Taoism value intimate 
relationships, but the ultimate goal in both philosophies is to rise above particular human ties to 
achieve a greater union, either with a society ordered according to the patterns innate to human 
nature or with the Tao (Whitman, 1985). This is distinct from the Western concept of 
individualism that holds that a human being is fully autonomous if he or she is allowed to 
discover what is distinctive about himself or herself as an individual, and the idea that people 
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understand themselves best when separate from others. Despite the differences between Western 
and Chinese conception of human autonomy, Western thoughts became an important influence 
on the Chinese understanding of privacy as history moved on. 
The impact of Western thoughts on privacy became evident in the early twentieth 
century. By the late imperial era, elite awareness of a Western notion of privacy and an 
appreciation of its benefits had been raised (McDougall, 2002). Faced with the chaotic political 
conditions of the late Qing period (1840-1912), that is an old and corrupted dynasty cornered by 
colonial powers of the West, and the need to build a strong nation state, the late Qing 
intellectuals were forced to reconsider the entire cultural and social basis of the traditional 
Chinese society. The adoption of Western-derived notions during this time, coupled with the 
urgency for reformation, created a new context in which privacy was imagined in the early 
twentieth century China (Zarrow, 2002; McDougall, 2002).  
 In contemporary China, the concept of privacy very much follows its equivalent in 
advanced democracies where privacy is regarded as a claim of the right to be free from unwanted 
attention and disruptions. The right to privacy is connected with individual rights to autonomy 
and self-determination. In Chinese terms, it is to establish a new si as gong, a powerful private 
public between domestic relations and state governance. In this sense, the contemporary Chinese 
concept of privacy follow closely the legal theories of privacy in the West, as exemplified in the 
U.S. and E.U. For example, dealing first with the status of the term “privacy” in the Chinese 
context, Zhang Xinbao (2004) defined privacy as a legal right by which citizens’ residences, 
inner world, financial situations, social relations, sexual life, and other matters of purely personal 
nature are protected from any intrusion by others. Another important scholar on Chinese privacy 
law Wang Liming (2012) defined privacy in a similar way, with an emphasis on privacy as a 
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right that belongs to individuals over their personal information and private activities that have 
no relation with public interest. These scholarly definitions of privacy are based on the 
international clauses including Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which accorded privacy the status of a basic right to all 
human beings.  
While the Chinese legal scholarship on privacy generally applies a framework that draws 
heavily from legal traditions in the U.S. and E.U., the Chinese social science research on privacy 
commonly follows the quantitative research tradition on consumer privacy in English-speaking 
academia (Shen, 2015; 2015; 2017). By far, little research on privacy in China, either in English 
or Chinese, has incorporated the theoretical insights from traditional legal theory and 
contemporary social theory and applied them on meditating the value of privacy in the 
surveillance society. This is the theoretical and empirical research gap that this dissertation seeks 
to fill. As our understandings of modern surveillance technology and its relationship to the idea 
of privacy deepens, and as the surveillance society rapidly unfolds around the world, making 
such theoretical connection and conducting empirical research become an imperative before 
meaningful insights about the value of privacy can be gained in the new historical context.  
Research Questions 
Guided by the above theoretical framework, this dissertation asks three major research 
questions. First, it asks whether information sharing behaviors among Chinese university 
students are consistent with their concerns for information privacy and government surveillance. 
This question probes at issues around the “privacy paradox,” which helps to reveal the socially 
constructed decision-making of Chinese university students as they engage in social media and 
various online service platforms. The quantitative survey results concerning information privacy 
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concerns, government surveillance concerns, social media and online service use, willingness to 
disclose personal information, adoption of protective measures, privacy literacy will help inform 
this research question. Secondary research questions include: (1) what is the association between 
concerns for information privacy/government surveillance and behaviors regarding use on social 
media/online services? (2) what is the association between concerns for information 
privacy/government surveillance and willingness to disclose personal information? (3) what is 
the association between concerns for information privacy/government surveillance and adoption 
of privacy protective measures? (4) what is the association between privacy literacy and, 
respectively, privacy/surveillance concerns, social media/online service use, and willingness to 
disclose personal information?  
The second research question asks whether privacy judgments about personal information 
are contextualized as Chinese university students navigate through various online platforms. 
With the way personal information and online service platforms are categorized in the study 
design, this research question will help illustrate how students make contextualized decisions 
about information sharing based on the type of personal information being shared and the nature 
of the platform that requires such information. Secondary research questions include: (1) how 
does willingness to share personal information vary based on the type of personal information 
being shared? (2) how does willingness to share personal information vary based on the type of 
platform with whom the information is shared? (3) how does privacy efficacy vary across 
different types of information on social media and online service platforms?  
The third research question asks how experience of state and commercial surveillance 
have shaped the way university students share their opinions and attitudes while on the internet, 
and what implications can be drawn about the Chinese surveillance society and information 
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policy. This research question is informed primarily by the survey design of this study. The first 
part of the question is answered by examining the differences in key variables between those 
who answered online and those who filled the same questionnaire on paper. A finding of a mode 
effect would suggest that knowledge and experience of online surveillance have had an impact 
on the way young people express themselves online, though methodological questions about 
using online survey methods to examine privacy attitudes and behaviors would also be implied. 
The final questions about implication for the Chinese surveillance society and information policy 
in general is answered using key findings from the survey in connection with theories on 








CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
The research method used in this dissertation is analytical survey. A nationwide mixed-
mode survey—web-based and paper-based questionnaires—is employed to investigate Chinese 
university students’ surveillance experiences and privacy behaviors. This chapter presents the 
research design for the study and describes the details of sampling, operational definitions, 
measurements, implementation, and a data analysis .  
As one of the most frequently used methods in communication research, a survey, or 
constructed question asking, is a great tool to learn about respondents’ cognitive beliefs or 
perceptions, factual knowledge, active feelings or emotional responses, and behaviors (Baxter & 
Babbie, 2004, p. 167). The survey method has the advantage of providing close estimations of 
the distribution of characteristics in a population by surveying only some members of that 
population (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2014, p. 2). It helps in deciphering factors that might 
serve as “explanations or predictors of certain viewpoints or a particular phenomenon” through 
using analytical methods (Luther, 2011, p. 146).  
With rapidly advancing computer technologies, online surveys have become the fastest 
growing form of surveying occurring in the U.S. and throughout most of the world because of 
the speed, low costs, and access to wide geographic areas (Dillman et al., 2014, p. 301). China is 
no exception to this development. Scholars have conducted successful online surveys in China 
by combining online survey service providers, such as Sojump and Wenjuan, and the Chinese 
indigenous social media application WeChat (Mei & Brown, 2017). However, nontrivial 
concerns have been raised about the sampling and validity of the data in web-based survey 
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design (Wright, 2005; Moy & Murphy, 2016), some of which are salient and need to be 
addressed in this study.  
Using Survey to Study Privacy and Surveillance in China 
Surveying people about digital privacy using online questionnaires invites 
methodological questions, especially those that concerns sampling. Using web-based surveys to 
measure an individual’s attitude toward online privacy and surveillance issues may produce what 
is known as sample nonresponse error, which happens when the characteristics of respondents 
differ from those who chose not to respond in a way that influences the study’s results (Dillman 
et al., 2014, p. 5). Indeed, research have suggested that the invasiveness of online surveys makes 
it highly possible that individuals with higher privacy concerns are already excluded in the 
sampling process (Evans & Mathur, 2005; Deutskens et al., 2006). A recent meta-analytical 
review on research about online privacy concerns highlighted the effect of the data collection 
mode (online vs. offline) on study results, indicating that studies conducted offline reported a 
weaker positive association between privacy concerns and the adoption of privacy protection 
measures than studies conducted using online methods (Baruh, Secinti, & Cemalcilar, 2017).  
Another important question about online surveys is that self-selection online surveys tend 
to oversample younger, better educated, wealthier male urban residents (Sills & Song, 2002; 
Chang & Krosnick, 2009). This, however, should be less of a concern in this study because the 
targeted population—university students in Chinese major cities—is well suited for online 
methods. This population is among what Sills and Song (2002) categorized as one of the select 
populations who “are connected and technologically savvy” and for whom “the cost, ease, speed 
of delivery and response, ease of data cleaning and analysis all weigh in favor of the internet as a 
delivery method for survey research.”  
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Furthermore, that this survey study takes place in China poses an interesting question 
about validity, one that concerns the probability of self-censorship among participants who 
presumably are aware of government oversight on the internet. While self-report measurements 
are generally subject to validity issues, concerns about participants’ candidness in this specific 
context is a valid given the widely known “Great Firewall” on the Chinese Internet and the 
expanding online surveillance in recent years.  
To address these methodological concerns, this study employs a mixed-mode survey 
design combining web-based and paper-based surveys. This approach would clarify whether a 
mode effect exists and if so, to what extent participants’ responses differ when they respond 
online and when they fill in a paper questionnaire on campus. Methodologists have increasingly 
encouraged the use of mixed-mode surveys because they help improve response rates and reduce 
survey errors as technology has made coordination across modes easier and response rates to 
single-mode surveys has declined (Dillman et al., 2014, p. 400-403).  
Sampling  
The population in this survey research is Chinese university students, both at the 
undergraduate and graduate level. Statistics released by the Chinese Ministry of Education 
(2018) showed that the number of undergraduates and graduates attending regular higher 
education institutions in China had reached 30 million in 2017. Sampling from such a large 
population on a national scale requires strategic methods, such as multi-stage sampling, which 
allows the sample to be further reduced by selecting a sample from the clusters in the population 
(Kemper, Stringfield, & Teddlie, 2003, p. 279). In this survey research, multi-stage purposeful 
sampling was used first to select the city that hosts the most higher education institutions in each 
geographic area—North, South, Middle, East, and West—and then select at least two institutions 
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with different subject focuses in the five selected cities. This multi-stage sampling strategy 
effectively reduces the sample size while still capturing a range of variation at early phases of 
sampling (Palinkas et al., 2015).  
In the first stage, Beijing (North), Guangzhou (South), Wuhan (Middle), Shanghai (East), 
and Xi’an (West) were selected as the cities that host the greatest number of higher education 
institutions (Chinese Ministry of Education, 2017). The second stage involves selecting 
universities with a variation of subject focuses. This is necessary because one of the special 
features about Chinese universities is that many are established upon their strongest subject, 
named accordingly, and nurture a unique culture around that subject (e.g. China Agricultural 
University, China University of Technology, Beijing Language and Culture University, Beijing 
Normal University). In addition, area of study is measured in this study as a potential  factor 
contributing to study subjects’ knowledge about privacy-invasive technologies and hence their 
attitude and copying strategies. Therefore, it is important to ensure that universities with different 
discipline marks are included in the study. However, this second stage sampling strategies was 
used only for the paper survey conducted on university campuses; it was not possible to apply 
the same strategy for the online sample because a different data collection method is used, as will 
be explained in the following section.  
Data Collection 
This study used different data collection methods for the paper-based and the web-based 
survey. For the web-based survey, an electronic questionnaire was distributed via Sojump, a 
Chinese survey platform with sample recruitment service (Mei & Brown, 2017). Sojump is by 
far the only survey platform that offers sample service toward university students around China. 
The limitation of this service is that it cannot pinpoint a specific university, which means that the 
 46 
second-stage sampling strategy, which seeks to sample universities with a variety of discipline 
focuses cannot be realized in the web-based survey. Nevertheless, all facts considered, Sojump’s 
sample recruitment service is the most time- and cost-efficient way of conducting an online 
survey in China that targets university students on a national scale.   
For the paper-based survey, this study follows Dillman et al.’s (2014) mixed-mode design 
principles, which require using the same questions and question order to minimize differences in 
visual design, and used the same questionnaire design as the online survey. The printed 
questionnaire was distributed on campus in selected universities by an research assistant who 
recruited participants in person in university libraries and cafeterias. The collected paper 
questionnaires were then transformed into electronic questionnaires for data analysis.  
In this study, online survey participants were offered platform credit and paper survey 
respondents were offered cash incentives for their participation. Procedures of data collection 
and incentive distribution were approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill.  
Survey Measures  
Eight central concepts were measured in the survey research, including information 
privacy concerns, government surveillance concerns, perceived need for government 
surveillance, social media and online service use, willingness to disclose personal information 
online, adoption of protective strategies, privacy efficacy, and privacy literacy. Most items were 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale. Privacy efficacy was measured on a 5-point Likert scale. 
Privacy literacy was measured using true/false/I don’t know questions. Social media use and 
online service use were measured on a frequency basis. The items used for measuring each 
 47 
concept were adopted from existing literature measuring similar concepts and adapted to reflect 
the context of this study  
Information privacy concerns. To measure internet users’ concerns about information 
privacy, the Internet User’s Information Privacy Concerns (IUIPC) scale developed by Malhotra, 
Kim, and Agarwal (2004) was used to capture three dimensions of concern—collection, control, 
and awareness. The IUIPC is an extension of the widely acknowledged Concern for Information 
Privacy (CFIP) scale by Smith et al. (1996). The first dimension, collection, adopted directly 
from CFIP, captures the concerns about the amount of individual-specific data provided to online 
companies relative to the value of benefits received (Malhotra et al., 2004). The four-item scale 
asks the degree to which participants agree with statements such as “It usually bothers me when 
online companies ask me for personal information.” The newly developed dimension control, 
defined as consumer willingness to “exercise process control and influence changes in 
organizational policies” (Malhotra et al., 2004), consists of four items including statements such 
as “I believe that online privacy is invaded when control is lost or unwillingly reduced as a result 
of marketing transaction.” The third dimension, awareness, captures consumer concern about 
awareness of organizational information privacy practice. This dimension contains four items. 
An example statement is, “Online companies seeking information online should disclose the way 
the data are collected, processed, and used.”  
Government surveillance concerns. Concern about government surveillance refers to 
individual concerns about government monitoring of internet activities. This variable was 
measured using the Government Intrusion Concerns (GIC) scale by Dinev, Hart, and Mullen 
(2007), which highlighted the lack of validated instruments that measure public beliefs toward 
government surveillance or similar latent constructs. The GIC scale consists of three items and 
 48 
showed good convergent validity and composite reliability (Dinev et al. 2007). The three items 
ask participants to indicate on a 7-point Likert scale the degree to which they agree or disagree 
with these statements: “I am concerned about the power the government has to wiretap Internet 
activities”; “I am concerned that my Internet accounts and database information will be more 
open to government/business scrutiny”; and “I am concerned about the government’s ability to 
monitor Internet activities.”  
Perceived need for government surveillance. Also adopted from Dinev et al. (2007), the 
Perceived Need for Government Surveillance (PNGS) scale was used to measure acceptance of 
government surveillance.  It is defined as the internet user’s belief that the government needs 
greater access to personal information and more authority to monitor Internet activities for the 
purposes of safety, efficiency, and reliable internet transactions. The four-item scale consists of 
statements including, “The government needs to have greater access to personal 
information/individual bank account,” “The government needs broader wiretapping authority/to 
have more authority to use high tech surveillance tools for Internet eavesdropping.” This variable 
was also measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly 
agree.” 
Social media and online service use. Social media use and online service use were 
measured separately because previous research suggested that behaviors regarding social media 
and online service relate differently to concerns about privacy (Baruh et al., 2017). To measure 
social media use, two questions were asked regarding the frequency usage of three social media 
platforms—WeChat, QQ, and Weibo. Participants were asked to indicate the average time they 
spend per day using each of the three platforms in the past week (1= less than 10 minutes; 2= 10 
to 30 minutes; 3= 31 minutes to less than 1 hour; 4= 1 hour to less than 2 hours; 5= 2 hours to 
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less than 3 hours; 6= 3 hours to less than 4 hours; 7= more than 4 hours). For measuring online 
service use, two matrix questions were used to ask participants how frequently they used six 
types of online services—banking, shopping, ridesharing, online travel ticketing, maps, and 
health management—in the past month (1= less than once a month; 2= once a month; 3= a few 
times a month; 4= once a week; 5= a few times a week; 6= once a day; 7= several times a day). 
The categorization of online services was based on general knowledge about the popular online 
platforms in China among young people.  
Willingness to disclose personal information. Personal information refers to the 
individual-specific data that is the primary source of consumer privacy concerns and includes 
five broad categories: demographic characteristics, lifestyle characteristics, shopping habits, 
financial data, and personal identifiers (Phelps, Nowak, & Ferrell, 2000). The categories were 
adopted and modified to reflect the context of Chinese university students. Accordingly, 
participants were asked to indicate how willing they were to provide to social media and online 
service platforms the following seven types of personal information: (1) basic demographics 
(age, gender, education), (2) contact (email, phone, address, social media accounts), (3) personal 
identifiers (government ID, name), (4) personal preference (browsing/keyword search/shopping 
history), (5) location (real-time location, location history), (6) financial information (bank 
account, debit/credit card), (7) health information  (medical history, health condition). 
Willingness to disclose personal information was measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 
“Never willing” to “Extremely willing” and was measured separately for social media (WeChat, 
QQ and Weibo) and each type of online service (banking, shopping, ridesharing, maps, and 
health management).  
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Privacy efficacy. To measure efficacy for information privacy, which is individuals’ 
beliefs in their ability to exercise control over own actions regarding personal information (Kuo, 
Lin, & Hsu, 2007), participants were asked to indicate how much control they think they have 
over the seven types of personal information (as listed above in “willingness to disclose personal 
information”) on social media (WeChat/QQ and Weibo) and the online service platforms (as 
listed above in “social media and online service use”). All items were measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from “No control at all” to “A great deal of control.” 
Protective strategies. Protective strategies are conceptualized as the power-enhancing 
behaviors of users to defend their personal information, which according to the model developed 
by Wirtz, Lwin, and Williams (2007) includes three individual actions: fabricate, protect, and 
withhold. The dimension fabricate refers to a user’s effort to hide his or her own identity by 
providing fictitious or false information and is measured with three items including statements 
such as “I would consider making up fictitious responses to avoid giving websites real 
information about myself.” Protect refers to the use of available software to safeguard one’s 
web-browsing behaviors from potential intruders and is measured on a three-item scale asking if 
participants would “use software to eliminate cookies,” “disguise identity,” and prevent tracking 
of emails. Withhold captures users’ refusals to provide personal information or use the online 
service and is measured with three items asking if participants would be “reluctant to register,” 
“refuse to provide personal information,” and “avoid using” the website or app. All items were 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale.  
Privacy literacy. Adapted from Westin (2009) and Hoofnagle and Urban (2014), privacy 
literacy was measured by six items about privacy policies. Participants were asked to indicate if a 
statement was true, false, or if they did not know about it. These items served as a quiz that 
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measures participants’ knowledge about what is and what is not covered in privacy policies 
which users must agree to upon joining a platform. Each of the true or false question frames a 
privacy right as being inherently available if a platform had a privacy policy. This helps to probe 
at the false belief that the mere presence of a privacy policy would guarantee legally enforceable 
privacy rights. Some example statements include “If a website or app has a privacy policy, it 
means that the platform cannot share information about you with other companies, unless you 
give the website your permission”; “If a website/app violates its privacy policy, it means that you 
have the right to sue the website for violating it”; “When you use the Internet to purchase 
products or to learn about medical conditions, advertisers are not allowed to track you in order to 
target advertisements.” Privacy literacy scores were between 0 and 6, with each question earning 
1 marks if answered correctly.  
Control variables. In addition to the common controls used in online privacy studies—
age, and gender—this study also asked participants about their major in college. The list of 
majors is in accordance with official categories published by the Chinese Ministry of Education. 
Education as another common control variable is not used in this study because the study sample 
is heterogeneous in terms of levels of education. Instead, participants were asked to indicate 
which their years in university.  
Data Analysis  
The first step for data analysis is to establish measure reliability and validity. Reliability 
refers to the consistency of a measure. In this study, the internal consistency of a measure is 
assessed by the statistic Cronbach’s α (the Greek letter alpha), which measures the consistency of 
participants’ responses across the items on a multiple-item measure. The acceptable values for 
Cronbach’s α are .70 and above, but a value of .80 or greater is generally taken to indicate good 
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internal consistency (Gliem & Gliem, 2003). Validity, on the other hand, concerns the extent to 
which a measure in fact assesses the variable it intended to. The validity of a measure can be 
judged based on various types of evidence including whether it covers the construct of interest, 
and whether the scores it produces are correlated with other variables they are expected to be 
correlated with and not correlated with variables that are conceptually distinct (Price, Jhangiani, 
& Chiang, 2015). In this study, factor analysis was used to test the dimensionality of scales and 
construct validity. Although most of the measures used in the study showed good reliability and 
validity in previous studies, it was necessary to run these tests since this survey was conducted in 
a new cultural and social context in China. In the case where an item did not load well on 
specific factors, the item was deleted to enhance construct validity and reliability was 
recalculated.  
Next, because this study uses non-probability sampling. It was necessary to consider a 
means of compensating for the underrepresentation of certain parts of the population. 
Methodologists have proposed various ways for modeling and statistical adjustments, such as 
using weighting procedures to adjust for demographic attributes according to census 
demographic data of the population (Cooke et al. 2007; Chang & Krosnick, 2009; Lensvelt-
Mulders et al. 2009; Pasek, 2016). However, the effectiveness of statistical adjustment is 
debatable. For instance, Lensvelt-Mulders et al. (2009) and Cooke et al. (2007) noted in their 
studies that propensity score matching and weighting would not compensate for the major 
difference between a random sample and a non-random sample. Some said that weighting is 
workable only for those who wish to evaluate relations between variables instead of looking for 
generalizable estimates (Pasek, 2016). It was also pointed out that the effectiveness of weighting 
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strategy depends on being able to identify variables that correlated with each of the variables of 
interest and then include them in the statistical adjustment (Baker et al., 2013).  
Thus, survey methodologists have concluded that weighting is not guaranteed to improve 
all estimates, and that weighted data are not necessarily more representative than unweighted 
data (Dillman, Smyth, & Christian, 2014, p. 89). In this study, no postsurvey statistical 
adjustment was employed. However, during the survey sampling stage, demographic data from 
the Chinese Ministry of Education (2018) and campus recruitment statistics released by 
Wutongguo (2018) were used as references to construct a sample that matches as much the 
characteristics of participants to known characteristics of the population as possible. For 
example, the online survey sampling controlled for the number of male and female participants, 
as well as the number of undergraduate and graduate students so that the sample matches the 
overall demographics of the university student population. 
To answer the research questions, basic descriptive statistics, a t-test, Pearson’s r 
correlation, and multiple linear regression analysis were conducted using SPSS. Basic 
descriptive statistics for the key variables and demographics are displayed with instrument items, 
means, standard deviation, and level of measurement. Cronbach’s alpha were reported to show 
measure reliability and validity. To test the association between variables, Pearson correlation 
coefficient was used to show the strength and direction of the linear association between privacy 
concerns, government surveillance concerns, perceived need for government surveillance, 
willingness to provide personal information, social media and online service use, protective 
strategies, privacy efficacy, and privacy literacy. Meanwhile, multiple linear regression analysis 
was used to examine whether the key variables and control variables predict willingness to 
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disclose personal information online. Independent sample t-test was employed to examine if 










CHAPTER 4: SURVEY FINDINGS 
 
As proposed in the last section of Chapter 2, this dissertation asks three primary research 
questions. The first question asks about the relationship between surveillance concerns and 
personal information sharing behaviors and attitudes. Associations among variables including 
attitudes toward information privacy and government surveillance, willingness to disclose 
personal information, privacy protective strategies, and privacy literacy are examined to answer 
this question. The second research question focuses on the contextualization of privacy attitudes 
and behaviors among Chinese university students. This question is primarily informed by 
participants’ responses to attitude and behavior questions in which different categories of 
personal information and online platforms are embedded. Finally, the third research question 
asks whether there are discrepancies in response between online and paper survey, which would 
indicate a mode effect with implications on conducting survey research on privacy and 
surveillance in China. The present chapter reports the findings from a national survey among 
Chinese university students in regard to these research questions.  
Research findings are presented in five sections in this chapter. The first and second 
sections reports participant demographics and descriptive statistics of key variables. The rest of 
the chapter reports the survey findings for each of the three research questions respectively. 
Secondary research questions are addressed in the corresponding section. Results from statistical 





 Before answering the research questions, it is important to first review the demographic 
characteristics of the study sample. In total, the sample consists of 1,204 university students from 
five Chinese cities that host the most higher education institutions. Among the 1,204 
respondents, 728 answered a web-based questionnaire via Sojump’s online survey platform, 476 
filled out a paper questionnaire on campus. The geographic distribution for the paper-based 
survey is as follows: Guangzhou 111(23.3%), Wuhan 101 (21.2%), Beijing 99 (20.8%), Xi’an 99 
(18.3%), and Shanghai 78 (16.4%). Due to IRB requirements, online respondents’ IP address, 
which would indicate their geographic regions, were not included in the data analysis. However, 
according to the sample service request that was submitted to Sojump, there should be about 150 
respondents each from Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, and 125 respondents each from Xi’an 
and Wuhan.  
Table 1 displays the participant demographics. Throughout this chapter, M refers to the 
mean value of a variable and SD refers to the standard deviation of a variable. The survey sample 
has an average age of 21.6 (SD=2.15), with the majority (95.5%) ranging from 18 to 25. The 
paper-based sample has more respondents over age 25 (4.8%) than the web-based sample 
(2.8%). The whole sample consists of more female students (54.2%) than male students (42.4%). 
About 3.4 percent of the respondents chose not to report their gender. This gender ratio fits the 
census statistics released by Wetongguo (2018), a national research institute on Chinese 
university students’ employment status, in which the females took 52 percent and males 48 
percent.  
The majority of the sample is undergraduate students (66.9%), while about one third 
(32.1%) is graduate students. According to the numbers of students in higher education 
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institutions reported by Chinese Ministry of Education (2018), undergraduate students took 86 
percent and graduate students took 14 percent. The web-based sample matches the overall 
characteristics of the university student population in terms of the ratio between undergraduate 
and graduate students (undergraduate 81.3% and graduate 17.2%). The paper-based sample 
consists of more graduate students (55%) than undergraduate students (44.7%).  
Respondents were also asked about their major in university. The top five majors are 
engineering (21.4%), economics and management (17.3%), media and journalism (14.5%), 
science (10.3%), and literature (9.1%). Among the 12 categories, philosophy (1.2%) and history 
(0.8%) are the two majors that have the lowest percentages. This sample characteristic matches 
statistics reported by the Ministry of Education (2017), which states that engineering, 
management, and literature were the three most popular majors while philosophy was the most 
marginalized in undergraduate education in China.  
Descriptive Statistics  
The survey questionnaire in this study measures eight central concepts around online 
privacy and surveillance. Information privacy concerns, government surveillance concerns, and 
perceived need for government surveillance are measured to indicate general attitudes toward 
commercial and government surveillance. The results show that, on a scale from 1 to 7, the 
surveyed students had higher concerns for information privacy on internet platforms (M=5.81, 
SD=.68) than they did for government surveillance (M=4.81, SD=1.20). Both measures showed 
good internal consistency assessed by Cronbach’s α with values of .80 and higher.   
Perceived need for government surveillance captures the perceived beneficial 
components of surveillance and the phenomenon that internet users may encourage and even 
become voluntary participants in surveillance practices (Dinev et al. 2007). For this variable, 
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participants scored an average of 4.79 on a 7-point scale. Although lower than its original 
Cronbach’s α value as reported in Dinev et al. (2007), the perceived need for government 
surveillance measure showed satisfactory Cronbach’s α value of .76. As explained in Chapter 3, 
Cronbach’s α measures the consistency of participants’ responses across the items on a multiple-
item measure. A Cronbach’s α value higher than .70 shows that a measure has satisfactory 
reliability.  
For social media and online service usage, participants were asked to indicate how often 
they used three social media platforms in the past week and how often they used six online 
service platforms in the past month. The results indicated that the participants are much heavier 
WeChat users (M=5.49, SD=1.54) than they are QQ (M=3.48, SD=1.91) and Weibo (M=3.58, 
SD=1.88) users. Among the six types of online services, online banking is the most frequently 
used service (M=6.11, SD=1.38), followed by online shopping (M=5.00, SD=1.35), online maps 
(M=4.08, SD=1.27), online ride sharing (M=3.37, SD=1.49), and online health management 
(M=2.77, SD=1.81). Online ticket booking was the least frequently used type of online service 
among the surveyed students (M=2.73, SD=1.12).   
Willingness to disclose personal information is measured for different types of person 
information. Results show that among the six types of person information, basic demographic 
information is the one that the surveyed university students are most willing to disclose 
(M=3.14, SD=.82). Willingness to disclose location (M=2.89, SD=.78) and contact (M=2.71, 
SD=.74) lies in the middle ground. The mean value for willingness to disclose personal 
preference (M=2.37, SD=.81), personal identifier (M=2.15, SD=.69), and health information 
(M=2.15, SD=.84) are below the midpoint on a 5-point scale. Financial information was found 
to be the least willing to disclose (M=2.03, SD=.68) among the surveyed university students.  
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For privacy efficacy, which measures individuals’ belief in their ability to control own 
actions regarding personal information, participants indicated higher sense of control over 
personal information on social media (M=2.71, SD=.78) than they did with online service 
platforms (M=2.58, SD=.82). Regarding adoption of protective strategies, which refers to the 
power-enhancing behaviors of internet users to defend personal information, a 9-item scale is 
used to measure three dimensions of protective strategies: fabricate, protect, and withhold. The 
mean value for protective strategies is 3.84, with a standard deviation of .85. The protective 
strategies scale showed satisfactory reliability measured by a Cronbach’s value of .73.  
For privacy literacy, it is appropriate to say that the surveyed Chinese university students 
failed the privacy knowledge quiz. The results show that, on a scale from 0 to 6, respondents 
have an extremely low level knowledge about platform privacy policies (M=.74, SD=1.07). Only 
8.2 percent of respondents answered three or more of the six questions correctly. More than half 
of respondents (57.1%) answered every one of the six questions incorrectly.  
Surveillance Concerns and Personal Information Sharing (RQ1) 
The first research question concerning surveillance concerns and personal information 
sharing attitudes and behaviors has five secondary research questions. RQ1.1 and RQ1.2 ask how 
information privacy concerns and government surveillance concerns each relate to willingness to 
disclose personal information. To answer RQ1.1, a simple regression analysis was performed 
using willingness to disclose the seven types of information as independent variables and 
information privacy concerns as the dependent variable. Another simple regression analysis for 
willingness to disclose the seven types of information predicting government surveillance was 
performed to answer RQ1.2. Table 4 displays the results of the regression analysis.  
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A linear regression analysis examines two things: (1) whether a set of independent 
variables sufficiently predict an dependent variable, and (2) which independent variables in 
particular are significant predictors of the outcome variable. In a regression analysis, when the p 
value for F is below .05, the regression result is significant. The R2 in a regression ranges from 0 
to 1. Value “1” indicates that the independent variables perfectly account for all the variations in 
the dependent variable. The β weight shows how much the dependent variable increases (in 
standard deviations) when the predictor variable is increased by one standard deviation — 
assuming other variables in the model are held constant. When the β value is negative, it means 
that there is a negative relationship between the predictor and the outcome variable. The p value 
for β needs to be below .05 for a variable to be considered as a significant predictor.  
As shown in Table 4, a significant regression equation was found for willingness to 
disclose the seven types of personal information predicting both information privacy concerns 
(F(7,1157) =20.43, p<.001) and government surveillance concerns (F(7,1164) =20.60, p<.001). 
Information privacy concerns are negatively related to willingness to disclose personal identifier 
(β=-.17, p<.001), preference (β=-.14, p<.001), and health information (β=-.12 p<.001), while 
government surveillance concerns are negatively related to willingness to disclose basic 
demographic information (β=-.11, p<.05), personal preference (β=-.16, p<.001), and location 
information (β=-.15, p<.001).  
RQ1.3, RQ1.4, and RQ1.5 ask how general willingness to disclose personal information 
is related to these key variables: commercial and government surveillance concerns, perceived 
need for government surveillance, use of social media and online services, privacy efficacy, 
adoption of privacy protective strategies and privacy literacy. To answer these three questions, a 
four-stage hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to predict willingness to disclose 
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personal information. Gender, years in college, and major in college were entered at stage one as 
control variables. The surveillance concerns variables (information privacy concern and 
government surveillance concerns) and perceived need for government surveillance were entered 
at stage two, social media and online service use at stage three and privacy efficacy, protective 
strategies, and privacy literacy at stage four. Table 3 displays the Pearson correlation coefficients 
for key variables and Table 5 summarizes the result of the hierarchical regression analysis.  
A hierarchical regression analysis is a way to show if the variables of interest explain a 
statistically significant amount of variance in the dependent variable after accounting for all 
other variables. As shown in Table 5, the hierarchical regression revealed that at stage one, the 
demographic variables including gender, years in college, and major in college contributed 
significantly to the regression model, F (3,1097)=14,82, p<.001 and accounted for 4% of the 
variance (R2=.04) in willingness to disclose personal information. Introducing commercial and 
government surveillance concerns and perceived need for government surveillance changed the 
variance explained to 16% (R2=.16). Adding use of social media and online service slighted 
increased the variance explained to 17% (R2=.17). Finally, the addition of privacy efficacy, 
adoption of protective strategies, and privacy literacy to the regression model changed the 
variance explained to 23% (R2=.23).  
When all independent variables were included in stage four, information privacy concern 
(β=-.19, p<.001), government surveillance (β=-.12, p<.001), and adoption of protective strategies 
(β=-.18, p<.001) negatively predicted willingness to disclose personal information, while 
perceived need for surveillance (β=.12, p<.001), online service use (β=.12, p<.001), and privacy 
efficacy (β=.17, p<.001) positively predicted willingness to disclose personal information. The 
most important predictor of willingness to disclose was information privacy concern. Social 
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media use and privacy literacy were not significant predictors of willingness to disclose personal 
information. 
Personal Information Sharing in Context (RQ2) 
The second primary research question is concerned with the contextualization of personal 
information sharing behavior and attitudes. In this study, the common types of personal 
information being shared with social media and online service platforms are grouped into seven 
categories: basic demographics (age, gender, education), contact (email, phone, address, social 
media accounts), personal identifiers (government ID, name), personal preference 
(browsing/keyword search/shopping history), location (real-time location, location history), 
financial (bank account, debit/credit card), and health (medical history, health condition). 
Meanwhile, the platforms where personal information are commonly shared are grouped into 
eight categories including two social media platforms (WeChat and Weibo) and six types of 
online service platforms (banking, shopping, ridesharing, maps, travel ticket booking, and health 
management). With these categorizations, willingness to share personal information is measured 
based on both information types and the platform where such information is shared; privacy 
efficacy is also measured separately on social media and online service platforms. Thus, three 
secondary research questions are proposed regarding personal information sharing behaviors and 
attitudes in context. 
RQ2.1 and RQ2.2 ask how willingness to share personal information varies depending on 
the information being shared and the platform on which the information is shared. Table 6 
displays the breakdown of willingness to share personal information across information types 
and platforms. The results on personal information types were reported in the descriptive 
statistics section in this chapter. To recall, respondents are most willing to disclose basic 
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demographic information (age, gender, education) (M=3.14, SD=.82) and least willing to 
disclose financial information (credit/debit card, bank account) (M=2.03, SD=.68). Between 
these two are location (M=2.89, SD=.78), contact  (email, phone, address, WeChat account) 
(M=2.71, SD=.74), personal preference (browsing/keyword search/shopping history) (M=2.37, 
SD=.81), personal identifier (name, government ID) (M=2.15, SD=.69), and health information 
(M=2.15, SD=.84).  
For platform types, respondents are most willing to disclose personal information on 
ticket booking platforms (M=2.84, SD=.73), followed by online banking (M=2.75, SD=.76) and 
online shopping (M=2.68, SD=.72). Below the midpoint on the 5-point scale are WeChat/QQ 
(M=2.46, SD=.61), online ridesharing (M=2.39, SD=.68), online health management (M=2.33, 
SD=.68), and online maps (M=2.32, SD=.63). Respondents are least willing to disclose personal 
information on Weibo (M=2.16, SD=.66).  
To further address RQ2.1 and RQ2.2, Figure 1-8 shows the contextualized information 
sharing attitude on each platform. As illustrated in these figures, respondents’ attitudes toward 
personal information sharing vary significantly depending on the appropriateness of the 
information context. For example, while willingness to disclose personal identifiers such as name 
and government ID is generally low on most platforms, it is relatively high on online banking 
and ticket booking platforms (Figure 3, Figure 7) where names and ID are essential to the service 
being provided. Likewise, respondents’ willingness to share financial information is very low on 
social media platforms such as WeChat/QQ and Weibo (Figure 1-2) but relatively high on online 
banking platforms (Figure 7). On online ridesharing and maps platforms, willingness to share 
location information is the highest among all information types (Figure 5-6). On online health 
management platforms, willingness to share health information is the highest except for basic 
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demographic information which respondents are generally most willing to share across platforms 
(Figure 8).  
RQ3.3 asks how privacy efficacy varies across information types and platforms. As 
displayed in Table 7, among the seven types of personal information, respondents show highest 
privacy efficacy on health information (M=3.26, SD=1.13), followed by financial information 
(M=3.01, SD=1.11) and personal identifier (M=2.83, SD=1.12). Privacy efficacy is low on 
location information (M=2.42, SD=.1.03) and contact information (M=2.35, SD=.1.03), and the 
lowest on personal preference (M=2.20, SD=1.06). Between social media (WeChat/QQ and 
Weibo) and online service (banking, shopping, ridesharing, maps, travel ticket booking, and 
health management), respondents showed higher privacy efficacy on social media platforms 
(M=2.71, SD=.78) than they did on online service platforms (M=2.58, SD=.82). Figure 9 
illustrates privacy efficacy on social media and online service platforms across information 
types.  
Web-based vs. Paper-based Survey (RQ3) 
The third research question focuses on the differences between web-based and paper-
based survey responses. RQ3.1 asks whether there are significant differences between the two 
survey modes on attitude variables including information privacy concerns, government 
surveillance concerns, perceived need for government surveillance, and willingness to disclose 
personal information. RQ3.2 asks whether there are significant differences on other variables 
including online service use, adoption of protective strategies, privacy efficacy, and knowledge 
about platform privacy policies. To answer these two research questions, an independent sample 
t-test analysis was used to examined the mean differences between web-based responses and 
paper-based responses. Table 8 displays the results of the independent sample t-test. 
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Regarding surveillance concerns, there was a significant difference between web-based 
responses (M=4.45, SD=1.20) and paper-based responses (M=5.36, SD=.97)  in government 
surveillance concerns, t(1200)=-14.44, p<.001, indicating that paper-based survey respondents 
reported higher concerns about government surveillance than did web-based survey respondents. 
There was no significant difference in information privacy concerns.  
A significant difference was found on perceived need for government surveillance 
between web-based responses (M=4.95, SD=1.10) and paper-based responses (M=4.55, 
SD=1.17), t(1199)=6.01, p<.001. The web-based survey respondents showed stronger belief in 
the necessity of government surveillance than did the paper-based survey respondents. 
Willingness to disclose personal information also differed significantly between web-based 
responses (M=2.61, SD=2.32) and paper-based responses, t(1172)=8.52, p<.001, indicating that 
web-based survey respondents are more willing to disclose personal information on social media 
and online service platforms than are paper-based respondents.  
No significant difference was found in social media use or online service use between 
web-based and paper-based responses. Adoption of protective strategies, on the other hand, 
differed significantly between those who answered the web-based survey (M=3.78, SD=.86) and 
those who took the paper-based survey (M=3.94, SD=.82); t(1200)=-3.18, p<.001. Paper-based 
respondents reported using more privacy protective strategies than did online respondents.  
Another significant difference was between knowledge of platform privacy policies for 
web-based responses (M=.68, SD=.92) and paper-based responses (M=.84, SD=1.25), t(1202)=-
2.38, p=.011. Privacy efficacy also differs significantly between online respondents (M=2.82, 
SD=.66) and paper survey respondents (M=.84, SD=1.25), ), t(1202)=-2.38, p=<.001. These 
findings suggest that those who answered the online survey are less knowledgeable about 
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platform privacy policies but reported a higher sense of control over personal information flow 
than those who filled out the paper survey on campus. The implications of these survey findings 





CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this study, as stated at the beginning chapter, is to investigate how 
Chinese university students experience state and commercial surveillance and how such 
experience has shaped their attitudes and behaviors regarding personal information sharing 
online. The research questions focus on three aspects: 1) the relationship between concerns about 
government/commercial surveillance and attitudes toward personal information sharing; 2) the 
situationally contextualized information sharing attitudes and behavior based on the types of 
personal information and the platform on which the information is shared; and 3) the 
discrepancies between web-based and paper-based responses in a survey study about 
surveillance and privacy in China and among university students.  
This chapter will discuss in detail the key findings presented in the previous chapter. It 
will also reflect on the research method used in this study and examine the limitations. Some 
perspectives on future research will be discussed at the end of this chapter. 
Surveillance Concerns and Personal Information Sharing 
The major findings of this study in regard to Chinese university students perception of 
surveillance is that they found both government and commercial surveillance to be concerning to 
different degrees; they would also agree that government surveillance is justifiable if it is for 
efficiency and public safety reasons. To recall the definition and operationalization, the 
instruments for commercial surveillance concerns assessed beliefs about the risks and negative 
consequences associated with sharing personal data with private internet platforms; the 
government surveillance concern variable measured concerns about government monitoring of 
individuals’ online activities and government access to personal information. The results 
suggested a higher concern about commercial surveillance than government surveillance. The 
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correlation analysis as displayed in Table 3 showed a moderate and significant positive 
relationship between the two types of surveillance concerns, indicating that those who were 
concerned about information privacy tend to be also concerned about government surveillance. 
In addition, perceived need for government surveillance, which measures the extent to which 
people recognize the beneficial aspects of government surveillance, was negatively related to 
both commercial and government surveillance concerns. This suggests that those who held 
stronger belief in justified government surveillance were less likely to consider surveillance 
practices concerning, be it from the government or private planforms.   
As inhabitants of the Chinese surveillance society, university students nonetheless 
disclose a large amount of personal information on a daily basis, willingly or unwillingly, as they 
engage on social media and online service platforms; and the relationship between their 
willingness to disclose personal information and concerns about surveillance is rather complex. 
The privacy paradox phenomenon shows that people’s concerns about information privacy do 
not necessarily reflect their privacy management choices such as usage of social media and 
online services, sharing personal data online, and engaging in privacy protective behaviors 
(Baruh et al. 2017; Dienlin & Trepte, 2015 Norberg, Horn, & Horne, 2007; Young & Quan-
Haase, 2013). The idea of the privacy paradox suggests that there is not a unified self when it 
comes to people’s concerns about information privacy and their actual sharing behaviors; they 
live in a fundamental paradox in the surveillance society.  
The findings of this study showed that, among the Chinese university students, those with 
higher concerns over commercial and government surveillance were less willing to disclose 
personal information on social media and online service platforms. The correlation matrix (Table 
3) showed that willingness to disclose personal information was negatively related surveillance 
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concerns and positively related to perceived need for government surveillance. This is further 
supported by the hierarchical regression analysis (Table 5) in which both information privacy 
concerns and government surveillance concerns were significant predictors for willingness to 
disclose personal information. The correlation analysis also suggested that those with higher 
information privacy concerns and government surveillance concerns were more likely to adopt 
privacy protective strategies. These findings did not reflect the conflicting self that is suggested 
by the privacy paradox.  
However, the privacy paradox showed where surveillance concerns did not affect the 
amount of time that Chinese university students spent using social media use and online service 
use. As shown in Table 3, there was no significant correlation between usage and concerns for 
commercial and government surveillance. Those with higher concerns did not use social media 
nor online service platforms less than those with lower concerns. Furthermore, when commercial 
surveillance and government surveillance are differentiated and crossed over with personal 
information types, the relationship between surveillance concerns and willingness to disclose 
personal information became more nuanced.  
 As displayed in Table 4 and explained in findings to RQ1.1 and RQ1.2, willingness to 
disclose demographic information was significantly negatively associated with government 
surveillance concerns but not associated with commercial surveillance concerns. The same 
pattern was observed for location information. With personal identifier and health information, 
however, a significant negative association showed between surveillance concerns and 
willingness to disclose for commercial surveillance but not for government surveillance. For 
personal preference, there was a significant negative association between willingness to disclose 
and surveillance concerns for both commercial and government surveillance. No significant 
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associations were found for contact and financial information. These differences suggest that 
participants’ willingness to disclose certain types of personal information varies depending on 
who they are more concerned about collecting and using that information. For example, between 
commercial surveillance and government surveillance, participants were less willing to disclose 
personal identifier and health information when thinking about surveillance from private 
platforms, and less willing to disclose demographic information and location when concerned 
about government surveillance.  
To sum up, this study found that the willingness of Chinese university students to 
disclose personal information online was significantly influenced by their concerns about 
commercial and government surveillance, which also drive their use of more privacy protective 
strategies. But, as the privacy paradox suggests, their concerns about surveillance did not affect 
how much they use social media and online services. These findings speak to the phenomenon 
that, as social media and online services become essential platforms for living and socialization 
in the networked society, it is increasingly difficult for the young generation to withdraw from 
these platforms no matter how much they are concerned about information privacy and 
government surveillance. In fact, against this backdrop, inhabitants of the information society 
enjoy very little autonomy and self-determination in regard to personal information sharing. The 
limited means of self-empowerment would include use of privacy protective strategies such as 
fabricating and disguising individual-specific information while engaging on the online 
platforms. But being able to exercise these measures requires that individuals have a certain level 
of technological knowledge and skills.  
Lastly, privacy literacy in this study did not relate to willingness to disclose personal 
information, despite of previous research suggesting that knowledge about privacy rights might 
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reduce the fear to disclose personal information and hence result in higher information sharing 
(Park, 2013; Debatin et al. 2009; Turow & Hennessay, 2007). This is perhaps because the 
privacy literacy variable had a very low mean value of .07 on a 0 to 6 scale, which is evidence 
that Chinese university students know very little about privacy policies on their social media and 
online service platforms. But it is also possible that the way privacy literacy was measured in this 
study—using false but affirmative statements about privacy rights covered in platform privacy 
policies—contributed to the overall low and skewed result on this particular variable.  
Contextualized Information Sharing Attitudes  
The findings of this study in regard to Chinese university students’ information sharing 
attitudes is highly consistent with what the theory of contextual integrity would suggest. The 
theory of contextual integrity posits that privacy is infringed not when consent is not granted as 
traditionally understood but when the contextual information norms or expectations of 
appropriate information practices are violated (Nissenbaum, 2012, 2019). The contextual 
information norm is determined by the sender and recipient of information, the type of 
information involved, and whether the information is used for commercial or noncommercial 
purposes (Martin & Nissenbaum 2016). In order to examine information sharing attitudes in a 
situationally contextualized manner, this study measured willingness to disclose personal 
information in a matrix of two factors: the type of information involved and the platform on 
which the information is shared. The results showed that Chinese university students’ attitudes 
toward personal information sharing vary significantly depending on the appropriateness of the 
information context. 
Before moving on to discussing the specific findings, some explanations about the 
contextualization is necessary. According to Phelps, Nowak, & Ferrell (2000), personal 
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information can be categorized as the following: demographic characteristics, lifestyle 
characteristics (including media habits) , shopping habits, financial data, and personal identifiers 
(names, address, social security numbers). In this study, these five broad categories were adapted 
in the Chinese context: lifestyle characteristics and shopping habits were merged into the 
category “personal preference,” which include shopping, browsing, and keyword search habits; 
address was taken out of personal identifiers and merged into “contact” together with phone 
number and social media account; government ID was added to the personal identifier categories 
because social media platforms in China would ask users to register their government ID one 
way or another; and a new category “health information” was added to address the increasing 
popularity of health management applications in China, which collect and analyze individuals’ 
basic biological indicator such as height/weight, their physical activity history, and in some cases 
detailed health conditions. These seven categories of personal information would cover most of 
the personal data that is shared online in a typical young Chinese person’s daily life.   
The online platforms are sorted into eight categories including the two most popular 
social media platforms (WeChat/QQ and Weibo) and six types of online services commonly 
used among young people in China. WeChat and QQ were merged into one platform because 
they are both owned by the Chinese tech giant Tencent and users account information is could be 
shared across platforms. Among the six types of online services, online ticket booking perhaps is 
the most unique for the China context. This is because, unlike in the United States, the absolute 
majority of the population relies on trains for short and long distance traveling in China. Before a 
national online ticket booking system was fully implemented in 2013, obtaining a train ticket on 
a desired date and time was highly challenging because of the almost always heavy traffic flow 
in China. For university students, online ticket booking platforms are essential when they travel 
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home during summer and winter break, which are typically the busiest times of the year for the 
railways. The rest of the service platforms including online banking, online shopping, online 
ridesharing, online maps, and online health management are utilized mostly similarly in China as 
they are in the United States.   
By situating personal information types and online platform categories in the context of 
typical Chinese young people’s daily lives, this study can illustrate the contextualized personal 
information management choices that Chinese university students make as they actively engage 
on social media and online services. This is an important contribution to scholarship on privacy 
research in China. As shown in Figure 1-8, Chinese university students’ willingness to disclose 
personal information and their privacy efficacy are fact highly contextual based on the 
information types and online platforms. Aside from basic demographics such as age, gender, 
education, which respondents generally are willing to disclose across platforms, attitudes toward 
disclosing other types of personal information varied depending on the platform.  
For example, on WeChat and QQ, which are social networking applications serving 
mainly social purposes, participants were more willing to disclose contact information than other 
types of personal information. On Weibo, a Chinese Twitter-Instagram mix where people follow 
updates from professionals and celebrities, participants were relatively more willing to disclose 
their personal preferences such as browsing and searching history. For online service platforms, 
willingness to disclose a certain type of personal information echoes the nature of the service 
platform on which the information is shared. For instance, participants would not mind sharing 
their location with interactive maps and ridesharing platforms or disclosing their health 
information with online health management platforms. This is contextual integrity in its concrete 
form in the digital life of Chinese university students.  
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While situated in the China context, these findings are consistent with Martin & 
Nissenbaum (2016) in which privacy expectations are found to be highly dependent on the 
contextual elements including information types, recipient, and purpose of use. What these 
findings have highlighted is that sensitivity of information and people’s expectations for 
information privacy are not fixed; they are context sensitive and show many nuances in the face 
of confounding variables. Thus, information context, as stated by the theory of contextual 
integrity, ought to be a key element for determining what information privacy means and when 
privacy is infringed upon in surveillance age.  
Studying Privacy and Surveillance in China: Survey Modes 
This study found a significant difference between the web-based and paper-based survey 
in most key variables. Those who answered the survey online reported lower concerns about 
government surveillance, adoption of protective strategies, and privacy literacy than those who 
answered on paper; they also showed higher perceived need for government surveillance, 
willingness to disclose personal information, and privacy efficacy in comparison to paper survey 
respondents. These findings provide a valuable reference for those who wish to conduct survey 
research in China, especially research that focus on privacy and surveillance issues on the 
Chinese internet.  
The mixed-mode survey design was necessary for both practical reasons and 
methodological concerns. From the practical perspective, the fact that this study took place in 
China’s mainland brings out the issue of state control of the internet, of which people are 
generally aware. This separates China from developed Western countries in terms of people’s 
awareness of government surveillance and the impact it might have on their risk perception when 
answering an online survey about surveillance. It is therefore necessary to examine whether 
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online respondents as a whole would answer questions differently from the paper survey 
respondents due to a general awareness of government oversight on the internet.  
Methodologically speaking, past studies on survey methods already highlighted the 
possibility that people with higher privacy concerns are excluded through self-selection during 
the sampling stage, causing a sample nonresponse error that influences the study’s results (Evans 
& Mathur, 2005; Deutskens et al., 2006; Dillman et al., 2014, p.5). Some reported significant 
differences in the strength of associations among privacy-related variables between online survey 
and paper survey (Baruh, Secinti, & Cenmalcilar, 2017). For these reasons, this study 
incorporated two survey modes and compared the differences between responses collected 
through online survey and paper survey.  
The results of the comparative analysis, as shown in Table 8, showed that the differences 
between the two survey modes were mostly significant. Paper survey respondents reported 
higher concerns over government surveillance and lower acceptance of government surveillance. 
Paper survey respondents were also less willing to disclose personal information and more likely 
to adopt privacy protective strategies than online respondents. Despite an overall low privacy 
literacy across the two survey modes, paper survey respondents reported better knowledge about 
platform privacy policies than did online respondents. Concerns over information privacy, 
interestingly, did not differ between online and paper survey responses.  
The differences between answers collected by online survey and paper survey indicated 
that awareness of government oversight on the internet may led to online respondents reporting 
lower concerns over government surveillance and less use of privacy protective measures; it may 
also contributed to higher reported support for government surveillance and willingness to 
disclose personal information among online respondents. One explanation could be that online 
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respondents had grown the habit of self-censoring and refraining from reporting concerns about 
government surveillance and usage of privacy protective measures. This is also evidence that 
experience of government surveillance had shaped the way Chinese university students share 
opinions and disclose attitudes in online environments.  
Finally, it is necessary to note that participants of online survey and paper survey showed 
different demographic characteristics, which may have contributed to the differences discussed 
above. As displayed in Table 1, the web-based survey had more participants under age 21, more 
male, less graduate students, and more students who studied science, engineering, economics and 
management. However, given that no significant difference was found between the two modes 
on information privacy concerns, it is reasonable to suspect that the different responses on 
concerns about and perceived need for government surveillance were the result of self-
censorship among the online participants.  
Implications of Study 
This study provides important implications on Chinese young people’s experience with 
online surveillance, doing research on privacy and surveillance in China, and more broadly on 
information policy in the surveillance age.  
As a survey project conducted in China’s mainland and among university students, the 
findings of this study are largely consistent with similar research conducted in the United States 
and elsewhere (Dienlin & Trepte, 2015; Norberg et. al, 2007; Martin & Nissenbaum, 2016). In 
the past four decades of opening and social reform, China has been a keen adopter of advanced 
communication technologies from the West. It is surprising that decades later Chinese people’s 
experience with the strange world of personal information gathering and digital mass 
surveillance resembles more than it differs from what a typical inhabitant of the information 
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society in the West would experience. The young generation internet users in China are 
confronted with the same paradox in which the desire to communicate and participate in the 
digital world came across with a dire realization of the conditions of mass surveillance in 
everyday life. Namely, their willingness to fully engage on digital media platforms, which would 
require disclosure of a large amount of personal information, is impeded by emerging concerns 
about mass surveillance from the increasingly powerful platforms as well as the traditional state 
institution. As a result, they apply a situationally contextualized mindset to personal information 
sharing practice as it became rather unrealistic for young people to fully withdrawal from the 
digital world. Such is a screenshot of human condition in the contemporary world that speaks 
across cultures and state boundaries.  
The special condition of the Chinese surveillance society revealed itself in the 
comparison between the two survey modes in this study. Government surveillance in the Chinese 
context is essentially different from Western democracies because of its one-party and post-
authoritarian political system. Due to a general awareness of government oversight on the 
internet, the Chinese young people in this study provided significantly different responses on 
questions about government surveillance and use of privacy protective measures when they 
answered online versus when they filled out the paper questionnaire on campus. This shows that 
awareness of government surveillance may have conditioned Chinese young people into 
practicing self-censorship in online environments, which is the signature of the Chinese 
surveillance society.  
On the method level, the differences found between online and paper survey respondents 
in this study should remind researchers of the special nature of privacy research in the digital 
age. As researchers around the world are increasing inclined to use online questionnaire for its 
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speed, low cost, and efficiency, privacy researchers should be more cautious about using online 
methods because a mode effect between online and offline survey would have more significant 
influence on research with a focus on attitude toward privacy and surveillance than it would with 
other types of research. The sample nonresponse error resulted from the invasiveness of online 
survey is problematic for privacy research because the demographic characteristics of an online 
sample could be different from an offline sample in a way that would largely influence the study 
results; even if the demographic difference is minimized by weighting, it is possible that online 
respondents would report a systematically lower level of concern or other different attitudinal 
measures than would offline respondents because of conditions in the particular online 
environment in the research context. For these reasons, it may be a good option for privacy and 
surveillance research to employ more mixed-mode survey methods. 
This study also provides insight into future information policy regarding privacy and 
surveillance because it sought to address some important theoretical inquiries such as what is 
privacy for and when is it invaded in the age of mass surveillance. Admittedly, this study 
eventually took the social science approach of surveying people about behaviors and attitudes 
toward defined concepts, and connecting social science research on privacy and surveillance to 
the legal scholarship has never been an easy task for research in this intersection. As Cohen 
(2015) pointed out, the dialogue between law and surveillance studies has been complicated by 
the fact that law often considers surveillance simply as the potential subject of regulation, while 
surveillance studies is concerned with the relationship between surveillance and social shaping 
and glosses over the processes of definition and compromise that regulators must confront. But 
one thing that might hold across the lines between law and surveillance studies is that legal 
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framework and doctrine shape the process of compromise that not only the law but also those 
who are under surveillance would have to navigate.  
The opening chapter of this dissertation argued that the concept of privacy as well as its 
value ought to be revisited in the context of the surveillance society if the privacy challenges 
raised by cutting-edge surveillance technologies were to be properly addressed. Through the 
theoretical perspectives by scholars such as Cohen and Nissenbaum who incorporated 
surveillance theories into the consideration of future information policies, this study argues that 
the current dominant conceptions of privacy are insufficient in the age of surveillance because 
they misconstrued the value and purpose of privacy in contemporary life. The research findings 
of this study would support this argument in the following two ways.  
First, the inhabitants of the information society have very limited autonomy and self-
determination when it comes to disclosure of personal information on today’s internet. Despite 
high concerns about privacy and government intrusion, individuals still would choose to engage 
on social media and online service platforms and disclose a wide range of personal information 
while doing so. This is because the networked self, as Cohen (2012) has theorized, are 
fundamentally confined by their social and cultural context. In a surveillance society, the subject 
of privacy is not the disembodied, rational, neutral, and self-determining selfhood that traditional 
liberal political theory would embrace. This makes the notice and choice principle in the current 
privacy policy framework, which makes individual choice the nexus of regulation, highly 
problematic. It should remind policymakers to not put the enabling and implementation of user 
choice in the center of the regulatory framework and invest more on examining the substantive 
virtues of the data practices in terms of privacy protection.  
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Second, in a time when online platforms have become indispensable for contemporary 
social life, privacy no longer means strictly restricting the flow of personal information. As 
shown in this study, individuals make situationally contextualized decisions based on the 
information type and the nature of the platform when they have to disclose personal information 
in order to participate in the digital world. There is not a fixed scale on which the importance of 
personal information can be ranked. Information that is deemed highly sensitive on one platform 
could be considered totally appropriate to share on another. For example, government ID is 
generally considered to be the type of information that should not be shared in online 
environments, but one would have to provide it to online booking sites when purchasing travel 
tickets. While it may be appropriate to share medical information with health management 
platforms, it is definitely reckless to disclose such information in other contexts such as one’s 
social media. Searching and browsing histories facilitate convenient online shopping but may 
reveal highly private information about one’s lifestyle to unwanted audience when used in other 
contexts.  
The real challenge to privacy, however, is the information system’s growing ability to 
synthesize information gathered from different corners on the internet to generate new 
knowledge about individuals that go far beyond recorded data and the context in which such data 
is collected. This should remind privacy policy makers that, instead of focusing on individual 
control over personal information on one platform, future information policy should care deeply 
about information sharing between platforms, which is largely out of individuals’ control but 





This study has several potential limitations. First, regarding sampling, this study 
oversampled students from highly ranked universities, female students, graduate students, and 
students who study media and journalism. Most of the oversampling came from the paper-based 
survey because the survey distribution was done by local informants who are mostly media and 
journalism professors and graduate students. The web-based survey participation was self-
selected, which means that individuals who are not interested in the survey topic were 
systematically excluded from the online survey. For a study of a large population, the 
nonprobability sampling strategies used in this study undermines the generalizability of the 
findings. This study also did not ask about participants’ ethnicity, assuming that the large 
majority would be Han, which takes about 91 percent of the population in China. It would be 
reasonable to suspect that people of minority ethnicities, especially those that are politically 
marginalized in China, would provide very different answers to questions about government 
surveillance. But this should be the concern of a separate research project.   
Secondly, the survey questionnaire for this study, when translated into Chinese, is ten 
pages long. Questions about willingness to disclose personal information and privacy efficacy 
are contextualized based on seven types of information and eight types of platforms, resulting in 
ten matrix questions, which may have caused respondent fatigue. Tired and bored respondents 
often answer “don’t know” or engage in straight-line responding (Lavrakas, 2008). Therefore the 
responses to the willingness to disclose personal information instruments, which are all matrix 
questions, and the privacy literacy instruments, which are “True/False/I Don’t Know” questions, 
may have been compromised because of the survey questionnaire design.  
 82 
Thirdly, the survey instruments used in this study were translated from its original 
English version into Chinese. The Chinese equivalent of the word “surveillance” is worth noting 
in this regard. The word “surveillance” in English carries a cultural connotative meaning of 
government suppression. To better capture this connotation, the Chinese translation of the survey 
questionnaires used the word “Jian Shi,” which is often used in the context of government 
surveillance, instead of its synonym “Jian Kong,” which means monitoring and is typically used 
in technological contexts such as closed circuit television monitoring. As with other important 
terms in the questionnaire, this study sought to provide participants with the most precise 
translation, but it is possible that some of the original meanings were lost in translation.  
Lastly, this study is limited in its reach into the issue of government surveillance in 
China. The ways in which the survey questionnaire was scrutinized by the Institutional Review 
Board and the survey service provider have put great limits on the questions that could be asked 
about government surveillance. For the online survey, the questionnaire was reviewed by the 
survey sample service provider Sojump.com who according to law must eliminate from their 
online survey platform any illegal content ranging from violence, obscenity, criminal activity to 
inciting anti-government sentiment. For the paper survey, the Institutional Review Board 
required that the researcher must obtain an official approval in each university where the paper 
survey is distributed. Therefore, the survey questionnaire must be reviewed and approved by 
school officials in the Chinese universities, which means that questions about government 






The continuing expansion of commercial and government surveillance in China invites 
extensive research on the emerging surveillance practices and the way in which Chinese people 
understand and experience such surveillance. However, there are practical challenges in 
conducting these studies. An inquiry into government surveillance issues in China that involves 
human subjects would exposes itself to strict IRB scrutiny in Western research institutions. A 
number of protective measures need to be taken to ensure that the study will not put participants’ 
safety or employment in jeopardy, if the study were to touch on issues that are considered 
politically sensitive in China. Even with these challenges, there are plenty opportunities for 
research on surveillance in China.  
For example, future research could explore attitudes and perceptions of commercial and 
government surveillance among different groups. The university students group, as examined in 
this study, has its limitation in terms of education experience and political perspectives. Future 
research could investigate experience of surveillance among journalists and foreign residents in 
China who might have different perspectives. Future research could also examine attitudes and 
perceptions of surveillance among the general public. Interesting differences might show 
between generations and between people with different level of education and privacy literacy.  
Regarding research methods, future research could consider measuring actual information 
sharing behaviors. This study only measured intentions to share personal information, which 
according to literature might relate differently to privacy concerns than actual information 
sharing behaviors (Baruh et al. 2017). The way social media use and online service use are 
measured in this study could also be further developed to capture multiple dimensions of use, 
including satisfaction and intention for continued use.  
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The original research design of this dissertation included a focus group component. 
However, due to a strict scrutiny by the Institutional Review Board that lasted for an extensive 
period of time, the focus group had to be dropped from the final project. Moving forward, more 
qualitative research is needed to address the larger questions regarding theory and policy, as well 
as the cultural aspect of privacy and surveillance in the China context.  
Looking beyond the China context, studies on experience with commercial and 
government surveillance could have a comparative perspective. For example, a comparison 
between the United States and China on citizen’s attitudes and perceptions about commercial and 
government surveillance has the potential to reveal the differences, as well as the fundamental 
similarities between the two countries in terms of mass surveillance on its people.
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APPENDIX 1. TABLES AND FIGURES 
 







 All respondents 
(N=1204) 
N %  N %  N % 
Age (M=21.6  SD=2.15)         
18-21 444 61.0  166 34.9  610 50.7 
22-25 263 36.1  274 57.6  537 44.6 
26-29 20 2.7  22 4.6  42 3.5 
30+ 1 0.1  1 0.2  2 0.2 
         
Gender identity         
Male 350 48.1  160 33.6  510 42.4 
Female 363 49.9  290 60.9  653 54.2 
Other 15 2.1  26 5.4  41 3.4 
         
Geographic region         
Guangzhou (South) - -  111 23.3  - - 
Wuhan (Middle) - -  101 21.2  - - 
Beijing (North) - -  99 20.8  - - 
Xi’an (West) - -  87 18.3  - - 
Shanghai (East) - -  78 16.4  - - 
         
Undergraduate/graduate         
Undergraduate students 592 81.3  213 44.7  805 66.9 
Graduate students 125 17.2  262 55.0  387 32.1 
Unclassified 11 1.5  - -  11 0.9 
         
Major in university         
Engineering 209 28.7  49 10.3  258 21.4 
Economics & Management 163 22.4  45 9.5  208 17.3 
Media & Journalism 21 2.9  153 32.1  174 14.5 
Science 91 12.5  33 6.9  124 10.3 
Literature 49 6.7  61 12.8  110 9.1 
Other 50 6.9  47 9.9  97 8.1 
Law 31 4.3  42 8.8  73 6.1 
Art 17 2.3  26 5.5  43 3.6 
Education 32 4.4  6 1.3  38 3.2 
Medicine 34 4.7  3 0.6  37 3.1 
Philosophy 9 1.2  6 1.3  15 1.2 
History 6 0.8  4 0.8  10 0.8 
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Surveillance concerns     
Information privacy concerns (α=.80) 1194 1-7 5.81 .68 
Government surveillance concerns (α=.82) 1201 1-7 4.81 1.20 
     
Perceived need for government surveillance (α=.76) 1201 1-7 4.79 1.14 
     
Social media use 1198 1-7 4.18 1.14 
WeChat 1202 1-7 5.49 1.54 
QQ 1201 1-7 3.48 1.91 
Weibo 1201 1-7 3.58 1.88 
     
Online service use 1202 1-7 4.01 .86 
Online banking 1204 1-7 6.11 1.38 
Online shopping 1204 1-7 5.00 1.35 
Online ridesharing 1204 1-7 3.37 1.49 
Online mapping 1202 1-7 4.08 1.27 
Online ticket booking 1203 1-7 2.73 1.12 
Online health management 1203 1-7 2.77 1.81 
     
Willingness to disclose personal information 1174 1-5 2.50 .56 
Basic demographic 1197 1-5 3.14 .82 
Contact 1198 1-5 2.71 .74 
Identifier 1198 1-5 2.15 .69 
Preferences 1191 1-5 2.37 .81 
Location 1196 1-5 2.89 .78 
Financial 1198 1-5 2.03 .68 
Health 1194 1-5 2.15 .84 
     
Privacy efficacy 1192 1-5 2.64 .74 
Social media  1198 1-5 2.71 .78 
Online services  1196 1-5 2.58 .82 
     
Protective strategies (α=.73) 1202 1-7 3.84 .85 
Fabricate 1204 1-7 4.30 1.14 
Protect 1204 1-7 3.39 1.16 
Withdraw 1204 1-7 3.84 1.21 
     
Privacy literacy 1204 0-6 .74 1.07 
 
 
Table 3. Pearson Correlation Coefficient for Key Variables 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Information privacy concerns 1         
2. Government surveillance concerns .25** 1        
3. Perceived need for government surveillance .03 -.19** 1       
4. Willingness to disclose personal information -.27** -.28** .16** 1      
5. Social media use -.03 .01 .06 .88 1     
6. Online service use -.04 .03 .02 .12** .16** 1    
7. Privacy protective strategies .16** .22** .02 -.23** .01 .03 1   
8. Privacy efficacy -.11** -.16** .12** .25** .04 .00 .06* 1  
9. Privacy literacy -.08** -.09** -.01 -.01 -.03 .04 -.04 -.09** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level 







Table 4. Summary of Simple Regression Analyses for Willingness to Disclose Personal 




Information privacy concerns  Government surveillance concerns 
B SE β  B SE β 
WTD demographic info .05 .03 .06  -6.29 .05 -.11* 
WTD contact info -.01 .04 -.01  -5.33 .07 -.02 
WTD personal identifier -.16 .04 -.17**  -.67 .07 .01 
WTD preference -.11 .03 -.14**  4.56 .05 -.16** 
WTD location .05 .03 .06  6.38 .06 -.15** 
WTD financial info -.07 .04 -.07  -6.40 .07 .06 
WTD health info -.09 .03 -.12*  -1.04 .05 -.04 
R2  .11    .11  
F  20.43**    20.60**  
*p<.001, **p<.05
 
Table 5. Summary of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Willingness to Disclose Personal Information 
Variable 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
B SE β  B SE β  B SE β  B SE β 
Gendera .13 .03 .117** .10 .03 .09** .09 .03 .08* .10 .03 .09* 
Years in college -.05 .01 -.16** -.04 .01 -.14** -.04 .008 -.14** -.03 .01 -.11** 
Major in collegeb -.034 .034 -.03 -.04 .03 -.03 -.03 .03 -.03 -.05 .03 -.04 
Information privacy concerns    -.19 .02 -.23** -.18 .02 -.23** -.154 .02 -.19** 
Government surveillance concerns    -.08 .01 -.17** -.08 .01 -.17** -.06 .01 -.12** 
Perceived need for government 
surveillance 
   .06 .01 .13** .06 .01 .13** -.6 .01 .12** 
Social media use       -.10 .01 -.20 -.10 .01 .02 
Online service use       .07 .02 .12** .08 .02 .12** 
Privacy efficacy          .13 .02 .17** 
Adoption of protective strategies          -.12 .02 -.18** 
Privacy literacy          -.02 .01 -.18 
R2  .04   .16   .17   .23  
F for change in R2  14.82**   52.80**   8.48**   25.47**  
a Male=1, Female=0  




















 Location  Financial  Health 
 
Average 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
WeChat/Q
Q 
3.57 .87  2.81 .97  1.89 .94  2.52 1.06  2.49 1.02  1.71 .90  2.21 1.06  2.46 .61 
Weibo 3.11 1.2  2.26 1.05  1.60 .81  2.36 1.11  2.28 1.07  1.50 .76  2.00 1.00  2.16 .66 
Banking 3.39 1.01  2.98 1.09  2.80 1.22  2.48 1.09  2.56 1.08  2.81 1.22  2.20 1.04  2.75 .76 
Shopping 3.14 1.07  3.07 1.10  2.20 1.04  2.99 1.21  2.85 1.14  2.48 1.14  2.01 1.02  2.68 .72 
Ridesharin
g 
2.73 1.15  2.66 1.13  1.96 1.01  2.01 1.00  3.44 1.18  1.96 .98  1.95 1.04  2.39 .68 
Maps 2.65 1.16  2.42 1.12  1.73 .87  2.12 1.06  3.37 1.14  1.71 .84  1.89 .97  2.32 .63 
Ticket  3.33 1.10  3.29 1.11  3.31 1.17  2.22 1.05  3.21 1.16  2.43 1.14  2.05 1.07  2.84 .73 
Health 3.21 1.14  2.19 1.01  1.70 .85  2.22 1.11  2.55 1.19  1.60 .76  2.83 1.35  2.33 .68 














Preference  Location  Financial  Health 
 
Average 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Social 
media  
2.37 1.21  2.38 1.18  2.97 1.28  2.17 1.18  2.51 1.18  3.17 1.26  3.36 1.26  2.71 .78 
Online 
services 
2.45 1.19  2.32 1.13  2.69 1.26  2.22 1.21  2.33 1.17  2.84 1.27  3.16 1.28  2.58 .82 




























































Preference Location Financial Health
Weibo
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Preference Location Financial Health
Online Shopping
 93 





















































Preference Location Financial Health
Online Maps
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Preference Location Financial Health
Online Health Management
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Preference Location Financial Health
Social media Online service
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Table 8. Independent Sample t-test Result Comparing Web-based and Paper-based Responses on 
Key Variables 
Variables 






t M SD  M SD 
Information privacy concerns 5.83 .65  5.79 .72 1.00 
Government surveillance concerns 4.45 1.20  5.36 .97 -14.44** 
Perceived need for government surveillance 4.95 1.10  4.55 1.17 6.01** 
Willingness to disclose personal information 2.61 .50  2.32 .60 8.52** 
Social media use 4.20 1.18  4.16 1.10 .59 
Online service use 4.00 .81  4.02 .92 -.32 
Adoption of protective strategies 3.78 .86  3.94 .82 -3.18** 
Privacy efficacy 2.82 .66  2.37 .79 10.36** 
Privacy literary .68 .92  .84 1.25 -2.38* 
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APPENDIX 2: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Q1 It usually bothers me when online companies ask me for personal information. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q2 When online companies ask me for personal information, I sometimes think twice before 
providing it. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q3 It bothers me to give personal information to so many people. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q4 I am concerned that online companies are collecting too much personal information about 
me. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
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Q5 Consumer online privacy is really a matter of consumers’ right to exercise control and 
autonomy over decisions about how their information is collected, used, and shared.  
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q6 Consumer control of personal information lies at the heart of consumer privacy.  
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q7 I believe that online privacy is invaded when control is lost or unwillingly reduced as a result 
of a marketing transaction.  
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q8 Online companies seeking information online should disclose the way the data are collected, 
processed, and used. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
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Q9 A good consumer online privacy policy should have a clear and conspicuous disclosure.   
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q10 It is very important to me that I am aware and knowledgeable about how my personal 
information will be used.   
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q11 I am concerned about the power the government has to wiretap Internet activities. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q12 I am concerned that my Internet accounts and database information (e.g., e-mails, shopping 
records, tracking my Internet surfing, etc.) will be more open to government/business scrutiny. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
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Q13 I am concerned about the government’s ability to monitor Internet activities. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q14 The government needs to have greater access to personal information for efficiency and 
safety purposes. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q15 The government needs to have greater access to individual bank accounts for efficiency and 
safety purposes. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q16 The government needs broader wiretapping authority for security purpose. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
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Q17 The government needs to have more authority to use high tech surveillance tools for 
Internet eavesdropping for security purpose.      
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 






10 to 30 
minutes 
30 to 60 
minutes 
1 hour to 
less than 
2 hours 
2 hour to 
less than 
3 hours 






WeChat  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
QQ  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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banking  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Online 
shopping  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Online 
ridesharing  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
Online 
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Q20 How frequently have you used per day using these online service over the past week?  
 
 
Less than 15 
minutes 
15 to 30 
minutes 
30 to 45 
minutes 
45 to 60 
minutes 
More than an 
hour 
Online 
banking  o  o  o  o  o  
Online 
shopping  o  o  o  o  o  
Online 
ridesharing  o  o  o  o  o  
Online 
mapping  o  o  o  o  o  
Online ticket 
booking  o  o  o  o  o  
Online health 
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Q25 When using online ridesharing services, to what extent are you willing to reveal the 





















o  o  o  o  o  
Personal 
identifiers (name, 






o  o  o  o  o  
Location (location 
history, real-time 




financial status)  




medical condition)  





  109 






















o  o  o  o  o  
Personal 
identifiers (name, 






o  o  o  o  o  
Location (location 
history, real-time 




financial status)  




medical condition)  





  110 
Q27 When using online ticket booking services, to what extent are you willing to reveal the 
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Q28 When using online health management services, to what extent are you willing to reveal the 
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Q29 On a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being "no control at all", 5 being "a great deal of control", how 
much control do you think you have over these personal information when you use social media 
(WeChat, QQ, Weibo)? 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Demographics 
(gender, age, 







o  o  o  o  o  
Personal 
identifiers (name, 






o  o  o  o  o  
Location (location 
history, real-time 




financial status)  




medical condition)  
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Q30 On a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being "no control at all", 5 being "a great deal of control", how 
much control do you think you have over these personal information when you use online 
services (banking, shopping, ridesharing, mapping, ticket booking, health management)? 
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Demographics 
(gender, age, 







o  o  o  o  o  
Personal 
identifiers (name, 






o  o  o  o  o  
Location (location 
history, real-time 




financial status)  




medical condition)  
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Think about the measures you usually take to protect your personal information when using 
social media and online service. Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each of the 
following statement. 
Q31 I would consider making up fictitious responses to avoid giving websites real information 
about myself. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q32 I would resort to using another name or email address when registering with websites so I 
can have full access and benefits as a registered user without divulging my real identity. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q33 When registering with websites, I may only fill up data partially. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q34 I would like to make use of software so that the recipient cannot track the origin of my mail 
(e.g. re-mailers). 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
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Q35 I would use software to eliminate cookies that track my web-browsing behavior (e.g. 
JunkBuster, WRQ AtGuard) 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q36 I would like to make use of software to disguise my identity (e.g. Zero Knowledge, 
Anonymizer, Freedom). 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q37  I would refuse to provide personal information to this website/App. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Q38 I would be reluctant to register with this website/App. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
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Q39 I would avoid using this website/App. 
Strongly disagree  
Disagree  
Somewhat disagree  
Neither agree nor disagree  
Somewhat agree  
Agree  
Strongly agree  
 
Please indicate if the following statements about privacy policy are true. 
 
Q41 If a website/APP has a privacy policy, it means that the website/APP cannot share 
information about you with other companies, unless you give the website your permission.  
True  
False  
I don't know  
 
Q42 If a website/APP has a privacy policy, it means that the website/APP cannot give your 
address and purchase history to the government.  
True  
False  
I don't know  
 
Q43 If a website/APP has a privacy policy, it means that the website/App must delete 
information it has about you, such as name and address, if you request them to do so.  
True  
False  
I don't know  
 
Q44 If a website/APP violates its privacy policy, it means that you have the right to sue the 
website for violating it.  
True  
False  
I don't know  
 
Q45 If a company wants to follow your internet use across multiple sites on the internet, it must 
first obtain your permission.  
True  
False  
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Q46 When you use the Internet to purchase products or to learn about medical conditions, 
advertisers are not allowed to track you in order to target advertisements.  
True  
False  
I don't know  
 
We are toward the end of the this survey. Please answers these demographic questions.  




Prefer not to answer  
 
















Q49 What is your current age in years? Please enter the number in the box below.  
 





5th grade  
Graduate student  
unclassified  
 
This is the end of the survey. Thank you for your participation.   
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 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
当网络平台要求我提供个人信息时，我会三思而后行。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
把个人信息提供给很多不同的网络平台这让我很不安。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
我担心各种网络平台收集了过多的我的个人信息。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
用户的网络隐私问题就是用户能否掌控个人信息的收集、使用和共享的问题。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
用户对个人信息的掌控力是用户信息隐私的核心问题。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
我认为当用户对个人信息失去控制之时，或者当这种控制力被强制减少之时，用户的信息隐私已经被侵犯。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
网络平台在线获取用户个人信息时应该公开其数据收集、处理和使用途径。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
好的用户网络隐私政策应该有清晰、易懂的说明。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
了解我的个人信息被如何使用对我来说很重要。 (单选题) 












 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
政府公共机构监视网络活动能力的增强使我感到担忧。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
政府公共机构需要拥有获取个人信息的能力，从而提高服务效率、保障网络安全。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
政府公共机构需要拥有获取个人银行账户信息的能力，从而提高服务效率、保障网络安全。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
政府公共机构需要拥有较大的监控网络安全的权力。 (单选题) 
 ○ 坚决不同意   ○很不同意   ○有点不同意   ○无所谓同不同意   ○有点同意   ○很同意   ○坚决同意  
 
政府公共机构应该使用先进的监视技术来保证网络安全。 (单选题) 



































微信 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
QQ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 















































○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
购物服务（淘宝、京
东、美团等） 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
出行 服务（滴滴出
行、共享单车等） 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
实时地图（百度地
图、高德地图等） 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
购票服务（携程、航
班管家、12306 等） 
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
健康管理（Keep、悦
跑圈、大姨妈等） 























育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、
QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 



















育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 



















育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 



















育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 



















育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 























育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
健康信息（疾病历史、健康现状） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 

















育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 



















育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
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身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
健康信息（疾病历史、健康现状） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
下面请您考虑自己在使用社交媒体和服务类应用时对个人信息的掌控感，即自己在多大程度上能控制个人信息被收集、
传播和再次使用，然后回答，如果 1 代表“没有任何掌控感”，5 代表“有很强的掌控感”，您认为有自己在多大程度上
能控制个人信息的传播。 (矩阵单选题) 
使用社交媒体（微信、QQ、微博）时，您感觉自己在多大程度上能控制以下几类个人信息不被抓取和使用？ 
 1 2 3 4 5 
人口统计类信息（性别、年龄、教
育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 




 1 2 3 4 5 
人口统计类信息（性别、年龄、教
育程度） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
联系信息（邮件、电话、地址、微
信/QQ） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
身份信息（姓名、身份证号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
个人偏好（网页浏览/搜索/购物历
史） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
所在位置（位置历史、实时位置） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
金融信息（信用/储蓄卡号、支付宝
账号） ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 









 ○ 极其不符合   ○很不符合   ○有点不符合   ○无所谓符不符合  ○有点符合   ○很符合   ○极其符合  
 
我会使用别名和不常用的邮箱地址来注册，这样我就可以在不提供真实个人信息的情况下使用该服务(单选题) 
 ○ 极其不符合   ○很不符合   ○有点不符合   ○无所谓符不符合  ○有点符合   ○很符合   ○极其符合  
 
我注册的时候可能只填写一小部分个人信息。 (单选题) 
 ○ 极其不符合   ○很不符合   ○有点不符合   ○无所谓符不符合  ○有点符合   ○很符合   ○极其符合  
 
我会使用具有删除网页浏览历史和删除 Cookies 功能浏览器。 (单选题) 
 ○ 极其不符合   ○很不符合   ○有点不符合   ○无所谓符不符合  ○有点符合   ○很符合   ○极其符合  
 
我会使用随机密码生成软件（比如 One Password, Last Pass），来保护个人信息数据安全。 
 ○ 极其不符合   ○很不符合   ○有点不符合   ○无所谓符不符合  ○有点符合   ○很符合   ○极其符合  
 
我会使用具有隐藏或更改自己 IP 地址的服务（比如 VPN）来保护我的个人信息不被轻易追踪 (单选题) 
 ○ 极其不符合   ○很不符合   ○有点不符合   ○无所谓符不符合  ○有点符合   ○很符合   ○极其符合  
 
我会选择不注册需要提供个人信息的网站或服务应用。 (单选题) 
 ○ 极其不符合   ○很不符合   ○有点不符合   ○无所谓符不符合  ○有点符合   ○很符合   ○极其符合  
 
我会拒绝向网站或服务应用提供个人信息。 (单选题) 
 ○ 极其不符合   ○很不符合   ○有点不符合   ○无所谓符不符合  ○有点符合   ○很符合   ○极其符合  
 
我会不再访问提供过个人信息的网站或服务应用。 (单选题) 
















○ 正确              ○ 错误               ○ 我不太清楚 
 
如果一个网络平台有隐私政策，这意味着它不能把你的地址和购物点击记录交给政府机构。 (单选题) 
    ○ 正确              ○ 错误               ○ 我不太清楚 
 
如果一个网络平台有隐私政策，这意味着只要你提出要求，它就必须删除你的个人信息，比如姓名和地址。 (单选题) 
   ○ 正确              ○ 错误               ○ 我不太清楚 
 
如果一个网络平台违反了它的隐私政策，你可以以此为由起诉这个平台。 (单选题) 
    ○ 正确              ○ 错误               ○ 我不太清楚  
 
网络平台追踪你的网站的浏览记录必须经过你的同意。 (单选题) 
   ○ 正确              ○ 错误               ○ 我不太清楚 
 
当你使用网络服务购买产品或者咨询疾病时，广告商不能追踪你的浏览历史并以此为根据投放针对性广告。 (单选题) 







 ○ 男生  
 ○ 女生  
 ○ 不方便回答  
 
您的专业是？如果您是双学位，请选择主修学位。 (单选题) 
 ○ 哲学    ○ 法学    ○ 教育学    ○ 文学   ○ 新闻与传播学    ○ 历史学    ○ 艺术  
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您的年龄是？ (填空题) 
                岁 
 
您现在读大学几年级？ (单选题) 
 ○ 大一  
 ○ 大二  
 ○ 大三  
 ○ 大四  
 ○ 大五  
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